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Abstract 
We report the results of an experimental test of alternative auction designs suitable for pricing 
and  removing  troubled  assets  from  banks’  balance  sheets  as  part  of  the  financial  rescue 
planned by the U.S. Department of Treasury in the fall of 2008. All auction mechanisms tested 
here are structured so that many individual securities or pools of securities are auctioned 
simultaneously.  Securities  that  are  widely  held  are  purchased  in  auctions  for  individual 
securities; securities with concentrated ownership are purchased as pools of related securities. 
Each experimental subject represents a bank which has private information about its liquidity 
need  and  the  true  common  value  of  each  security.  We  study  bidding  behavior  and 
performance of sealed-bid uniform-price auctions and dynamic clock auctions. The clock and 
sealed-bid  auctions  resulted  in  similar  prices.  However,  the  clock  auctions  resulted  in 
substantially  higher  bank  payoffs,  since  the  dynamic  auction  enabled  the  banks  to  better 
manage their liquidity needs. The clock auctions also reduced bidder error. The experiments 
demonstrated the feasibility of quickly implementing simple and effective auction designs to 
help resolve the crisis. 
(JEL  D44,  C92,  G01,  G21.  Keywords:  financial  crisis,  uniform-price  auction,  clock  auction, 
market design, experiments, troubled assets, TARP.) 
                                                            
* Economics professors at the University of Maryland.  
† Economist at the Economic Research Service, USDA. 
‡ Market Design Economist at the Congressional Budget Office. 
Correspondence to: ausubel@econ.umd.edu, pcramton@gmail.com, filizozbay@econ.umd.edu, 
nathanielhiggins@gmail.com, ozbay@econ.umd.edu, and astocking@cbo.gov. We thank Power Auctions LLC and 
its employees for customizing the auction software and making it available for this purpose. The analysis and 
conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as those of the 
Congressional Budget Office, the Economic Research Service, or the US Department of Agriculture. 2 
 
1  Introduction 
In the fall of 2008, U.S. housing and financial markets were in the midst of severe adjustments. 
House prices were falling rapidly, and they were expected to continue to fall. Problems in the housing 
and mortgage markets had spread to a broader array of financial markets. The nation was facing a 
serious disruption to the functioning of its financial markets that could substantially impair economic 
activity.
1 The adjustment began following the housing boom that ran from 2003 to early 2006,  when 
delinquencies and foreclosures on mortgages rose, particularly on subprime adjustable -rate mortgage 
loans (ARMs). Delinquencies also arose for prime ARMs and on so -called alt-A mortgage loans, which 
were  made  on  the  basis  of  little  or  no  documentation  of  the  borrower’s  income.  Because  most 
mortgages were resold as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), the rise in delinquencies caused the value 
of MBSs to decline, in some cases quite sharply. 
The problems in mortgage markets spread to the wider financial markets for several reasons. The 
number of bad mortgages and, consequently, losses on MBSs were expected to be large. The use of 
complex  instruments  to  fund  subprime  lending,  such  as  collateralized  debt  obligations  (CDOs),  also 
made it difficult for participants in financial markets to identify the magnitude of the exposure of other 
participants to losses. Moreover, a number of financial institutions borrowed heavily to finance their 
mortgage holdings, further increasing their risk exposure. Losses on mortgage assets, and the resulting 
contraction of the availability of credit to businesses and households, posed a significant threat to the 
pace of economic activity.  
The U.S. Department of Treasury and the Federal Reserve, led by Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke 
respectively, considered a host of policy responses to address the illiquidity triggered by market panic 
and the potential insolvency of many financial institutions. On 3 October 2008, the US Congress passed 
and the President signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-343). The 
Act established the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) which authorized the Secretary of 
the Treasury to purchase, hold, and sell a wide variety of financial instruments, particularly those that 
are based on or related to residential or commercial mortgages issued prior to September 17, 2008. The 
authority to enter into agreements to purchase such financial instruments, which the proposal refers to 
as troubled assets, would expire two years after its enactment. 
An immediate question was what auction designs were well suited to the task. Phillip Swagel, who 
served as assistant secretary for economic policy at Treasury from December 2006 to 20 January 2009, 
recalls that in September, “…we were already working hard to set up reverse auctions with which to buy 
structured financial products such as [mortgage-backed securities], focusing on mechanisms to elicit 
market  prices.  On  this  we  received  a  huge  amount  of  help  from  auction  experts  in  academia—an 
outpouring of support that to us represented the economics profession at its finest.” (Swagel, 2009, p. 
47-48). In a reverse auction, sellers compete with each other to sell a product to a single buyer. 
Several potential mechanisms were suggested by market design economists. Ausubel and Cramton 
(2008a,b) suggested the use of a simultaneous descending clock auction (with some particular features 
we describe below). Klemperer (2009) suggested a novel sealed-bid auction he dubbed the “product-
mix” auction. Treasury settled on a mixed approach: again according to Swagel, “We would have tried 
two auction approaches, one static and one dynamic—the latter approach is discussed by Lawrence 
Ausubel and Peter Cramton [2008a], who were among the academic experts providing enormous help 
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the credit markets specifically, see Mizen (2008) and CBO (2008). For a careful study of the conditions in the CDO 
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to the Treasury in developing the reverse auctions.” (Swagel, 2009, p. 56) Regardless of the approach 
used, the Treasury had decided to use “reference prices” in order to purchase many different securities 
(i.e. securities with many different CUSIPs) in a single auction.
2 
The use of a reference price is necessary to  hold a single auction during which bidders compete to 
sell a diverse mix of securities. Because ownership of many of the assets was highly  concentrated (i.e. 
competition to sell a single CUSIP would have been relatively low) assets would be grouped together in a 
pooled-security reverse auction. Each asset is “scored” with a reference price so that the different asset-
types can be compared on a single dimension and a single clearing price is determined in the auction. 
Reference prices were to be based on Treasury’s best estimates—albeit imperfect estimates—of 
the value of each CUSIP. Treasury, concerned that poor estimates would be taken advantage of by 
bidders, considered an auction format in which the reference prices would not be announced until after 
the auction. Armantier, Holt, and Plott (2010) conducted an experimental test of auctions where the 
reference price is announced only after bidding has taken place, finding that keeping reference prices 
secret reduced efficiency and did not save the government money. 
The research experiments described here were implemented in October 2008 and were designed 
to further test several auction mechanisms and design features considered for use by the Treasury. Both 
experiments include a comparison of sealed-bid and dynamic auctions for many assets (many securities 
with unique CUSIPs). Experiment 1 tests an auction appropriate for conditions in which ownership of the 
assets  at  auction  are  evenly  distributed  among  banks.  Experiment  2  tests  an  auction  mechanism 
appropriate  for  conditions  in  which  ownership  is  instead  concentrated  unevenly.  The  auctions  in 
Experiment 2 are very similar to the auctions that would have been used by the Treasury to purchase 
toxic assets. 
Several conclusions emerged from the experiments. 
  The auctions were competitive. Owing to the bidders’ liquidity needs, Treasury paid less 
than the true common value of the securities under either format. 
  The sealed-bid auction was more prone to bidder error. 
  The dynamic clock auction enabled bidders to manage their liquidity needs better. 
  The bidders attained higher payoffs (trading profits plus liquidity bonus) in the dynamic 
clock auctions than in the sealed-bid auctions. 
  Nevertheless, the clock auctions resulted in equivalent aggregate expenditures, so that the 
benefit to the bidders did not come at the taxpayers’ expense. 
  The prices resulting from the clock auctions were a better indication of true values than 
those from the sealed-bid auctions. We conclude from this that in the context of a troubled-
asset crisis like the one facing the Treasury in 2008 the clock auction is apt to reduce risk for 
both banks and the Treasury, and to generate price information that may help to unfreeze 
secondary markets. 
We conclude that the dynamic clock auction is more beneficial than the sealed-bid auction for both 
the banks and the taxpayers. The banks attain higher payoffs than in the sealed-bid auction, resulting 
from better liquidity management. The taxpayers are also better off, as the asset purchase program is 
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better directed toward the liquidity needs of the banking sector without increasing the cost of the asset 
purchase program. The variability of outcomes is also reduced and the informativeness of prices is also 
increased with the clock format. 
The experiment allowed us to do more than compare static and dynamic auctions. More broadly, 
the experimental format allowed us to create a market design test bed. The test bed helped us to do 
three  things  important  for  all  applied  market  design:  (1)  demonstrate  the  feasibility  for  quick 
implementation of the auction design; (2) subject the auction design to testing for vulnerabilities; and 
(3) predict strategic behavior. The commercial auction platform was customized to handle both formats 
in  one  week,  demonstrating  feasibility.  Both  formats  are  easy  to  explain  to  bidders.  Sophisticated 
subjects required only a three-hour training session to understand the setting, the auction rules, and to 
practice  using  the  software.  Since  the  auction  design  was  novel  and  had  not  been  field-tested,  a 
laboratory test was an important part of due diligence. Without the laboratory test bed, we would not 
have discovered the special vulnerability of the sealed-bid auction to bidder errors. Finally, the test bed 
was useful in helping to elicit probable strategies from bidders. Again, because the auction format was 
novel and further because the auction was too complex for equilibrium analysis, bidder behavior could 
not be predicted without a test bed experiment. 
Ultimately,  on  12  November  2008,  the  Treasury  decided  to  concentrate  on  negotiated  equity 
purchases and postpone the purchase of troubled assets via auction.
3 In March 2009, the Treasury 
proposed auctions to purchase pools of legacy loans from banks’ balance sheets, but this time using a 
forward auction in which private investors compete to buy the pools of loans. Ausubel and Cramton 
(2009) describe the auction design issues in this new setting and argue for a two-sided auction in which 
the private investors compete to buy loan pools in a forward auction, and then banks compete in a 
reverse auction to determine which trades transact. The results we present here are fully applicable to 
the legacy-loan setting as well. The forward auction is analogous to the security-by-security auction, and 
the reverse auction is analogous to the reference price auction. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 we summarize the experimental 
literature with respect to dynamic and sealed-bid auctions. Our analysis builds on this literature. Section 
3 briefly describes the experimental setup. The instructions and related materials are available in the 
appendix.  Section  4  provides  an  econometric  analysis  of  the  results.  Section  5  describes  the 
implementation and results of a recombinant procedure, a procedure that explores the full range of 
outcomes in the sealed-bid auction. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Dynamic vs. static auction designs 
There is a rich economic literature that points to the advantages of a competitive process over 
negotiation (see e.g., Bulow and Klemperer, 1996) and thus we focus exclusively on the use of auctions 
to accomplish Treasury’s objectives. It is within this context that we designed our auction experiment to 
help us understand the outcomes and relative advantages of alternative auction formats. One of the 
initial decisions facing Treasury was whether to conduct a static (sealed-bid) or dynamic (descending-
bid) auction.
4 
A frequent motivation for the use of dynamic auctions is reducing common -value uncertainty 
(Milgrom and Weber 1982). In th e troubled-asset setting there is a strong common -value element: A 
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4 See Ausubel and Cramton (2004, 2006), Cramton (1998), McAfee and McMillan (1987), and Milgrom (2004) for 
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security’s value is closely related to its “hold to maturity value,” which is roughly the same for each 
bidder. Each bidder has an estimate of this value, but the true value is unknown. The dynamic auction, 
by revealing market supply as the price declines, lets the bidders condition their bids on the aggregate 
market information. As a result, common-value uncertainty is reduced and bidders will be comfortable 
bidding more aggressively without falling prey to the winner’s curse—the tendency in a procurement 
setting of naïve sellers to sell at prices below true value. 
In the context of many securities, the price discovery of a dynamic auction plays another important 
role. By seeing tentative price information, bidders are better able to make decisions about the quantity 
of each good to sell. This is particularly useful because the values of securities are related. Bidding in the 
absence of price information makes the problem much more difficult for bidders. Furthermore, with a 
dynamic auction, the bidder is better able to manage both liquidity needs and portfolio risk. In contrast, 
managing liquidity needs in a simultaneous sealed-bid auction is almost impossible. 
Another advantage of a dynamic auction is transparency. Each bidder can see what it needs to do 
to win a particular quantity. If the bidder sells less, it is the result of the bidder’s conscious decision to 
sell less at such a price. This transparency is a main reason for the high efficiency of the descending clock 
auction in practice. 
Finally, as a practical matter, a clock auction allows for feedback between auction rounds, reducing 
the  likelihood  that  a  mistaken  bid  will  go  undetected.  Bidders  do  make  mistakes,  entering  bids 
incorrectly because of keystroke or other human  error.  A  recent  example  occurred in  the Mexican 
Central Bank’s auction for U.S. currency on 19 May 2009. A bank entered an erroneous bid that caused it 
to overpay by US$355,340. All other accepted bids in the auction were within 0.3% of the exchange rate 
traded that day, while the erroneous bid was 7.4% greater than the concurrent rate.
5 Reducing the 
likelihood of bidder error is important. We provide evidence in this paper that bidder error is less likely 
under the clock format than under the sealed-bid format. 
The experimental economics literature strongly supports the conclusion that dynamic auctions 
outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and price discovery. In sealed-bid auctions there is 
a tendency to consistently overbid (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin 1987; McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith 1990), 
often resulting in inefficient outcomes. In contrast, many laboratory and field experiments have 
demonstrated that the clock auction format is simple enough that even inexperienced bidders can 
quickly learn to bid optimally (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin 1987). Kagel (1995) finds that bidders readily 
transfer the experience gained in sealed -bid auctions to the clock auction format. Bidders in Levin, 
Kagel, and Richard (1996) appear to adopt simple strategies that incorporate   dynamically changing 
information from the clock auction, namely the prices at which other bidders drop out, and efficient 
outcomes are obtained. 
A principal benefit of the clock auction is the inherent price -discovery mechanism that is absent in 
any sealed-bid auction. Specifically, as the auction progresses, participants learn how the aggregate 
demand changes with price, which allows bidders to update their own strategies and avoid the winner’s 
curse  (Kagel  1995).  Levin,  Kagel,  and  Richard  (1996)  show  that  bidders  suffer  from  a  more  severe 
winner’s curse in the sealed-bid format than in a clock auction. Kagel and Levin (2001) compare a clock 
auction and a sealed-bid auction when bidders demand multiple units, and confirm that outcomes are 
much  closer  to  optimal  in  the  clock  auction.  Efficiency  in  the  clock  auction  always  exceeded  97%. 
                                                            




Moreover, in the Ausubel auction (a particular type of clock auction, see Ausubel 2004, 2006) bidders 
achieve optimal outcomes 85.2% of the time, as compared to only 13.6% of the time in a sealed-bid 
auction. McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1990) found 100% efficient outcomes in 43 of 44 auctions using a 
clock auction. Kagel and Levin (2008) provide further evidence of more efficient outcomes with a clock 
format in the multi-unit setting. Alsemgeest, Noussair, and Olson (1996) also find that clock auctions are 
efficient both in single and multi-unit supply scenarios, achieving better than 99.5% efficiency and 98% 
efficiency. 
The  principle  advantage  of  a  sealed-bid  auction  is  its  apparent  simplicity  and  relatively 
“inexpensive” setup. Some would argue that a sealed-bid auction is also less vulnerable to collusion. 
Some also fear that even a quick dynamic auction would expose participants to significant unhedged 
positions  as  a  result  of  real  time  interactions  with  financial  markets.  This  latter  complaint  can  be 
addressed by conducting the auction when the major financial markets are closed. 
3  Experimental setup 
During  the  period  12-24  October  2008  and  6-11  November  2008,  using  commercial  auction 
software customized for our purpose, we tested two different auction environments at the University of 
Maryland’s experimental economics laboratory.
6 The objective of the experimental setup was to mimic 
the environment faced by the Department of Treasury. Specifically, Treasury faced the challenge of 
purchasing assets so as to balance two competing criteria: 1) assuring that the taxpayer would not 
overpay for the assets; and 2) improving banking sector stability by purchasing assets from those banks 
most in need of liquidity. Ausubel and Cramton (2008a,b) discussed the design issues as they appeared 
in  October  2008  and  proposed  a  specific  auction  format.  The  experiments  described  below  were 
designed  to  provide  insights  into  bidding  behavior  and  performance  of  that  format  relative  to 
alternative formats, as well as demonstrate the feasibility of quickly implementing either format of 
auction as part of the financial rescue. For each auction format and information setting analyzed, we 
compare  sealed-bid  uniform-price  auctions  with  dynamic  clock  auctions,  varying  the  level  of 
competition, information, and banks’ need for liquidity. 
The experimental auction environments were closely tailored to the likely settings of the planned 
auctions for troubled assets. Specifically, to model the case where there was sufficient competition to 
conduct  a  competitive  auction  for  individual  securities,  we  ran  an  8-security  simultaneous  reverse 
auction. Each security had a pure common value with unconditional expectation of 50 cents on the 
dollar, bidders had private information about the common value, and a fixed quantity of each security 
was purchased in the same reverse auction. This is what we refer to as a security-by-security auction. In 
the second auction environment, the ownership of the security was too concentrated to allow individual 
purchase. Securities of a similar quality were instead pooled together, thus mitigating the concentration-
of-ownership problem. In this second auction environment each security had a pure common value, 
bidders had asymmetric endowments, and bidders with larger holdings of a security had more private 
information about the common value. In order to implement an auction where dissimilar items are 
purchased together, bidders compete on the basis of a reference price, which reflects the government’s 
best  estimate  of  the  security’s  value.  Bidders  then  compete  on  a  relative  basis—a  bid  expresses 
willingness to tender a security at a stated percentage of the security's reference price. This is what we 
refer to as a reference price auction. 
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The human subjects bidding in the auctions were experienced PhD students, highly motivated by 
the  prospect  of  earning  roughly  $1200  each—the  actual  amount  depending  on  performance—for 
participating in twelve experimental sessions, each lasting two to three hours, over the three-week 
period. We chose to use experienced PhD students for these experiments, since the environment is 
considerably  more  complex  than  a  typical  economics  experiment,  and  we  believed  that  the  PhD 
students’ behavior would be more representative of the sophisticated financial firms who would be 
participating in the actual auctions. 
In  terms  of  scope,  the  experimental  “banks”  held  roughly  8,000  distinct  troubled  securities, 
potentially available for purchase. For the purposes of this paper, these assets fall into two general 
groups: 1) those securities with ownership concentrated among only a few firms; and 2) those securities 
with less concentrated ownership. By the nature of these troubled assets, both the banks and the 
government  believed  them  to  be  worth  less  than  face  value.  However,  some  securities  are  more 
“troubled” than others. Some are relatively high-valued securities (e.g., a market value of 75 cents on 
the dollar) and others are relatively low-valued securities (e.g., a market value of 25 cents on the dollar). 
For  purposes  of  exposition  we  describe  the  two  auction  environments  as  Experiment  1,  an  8-
security  simultaneous  reverse  auction,  and  Experiment  2,  a  pooled  security  reverse  auction. 
Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted over a total of 12 sessions. The schedule of treatments is given in 
Table 1. The individual and pooled auctions are described below, with more detail provided in the 
appendix. Each session involved four auctions in the order indicated. 8 
 
Table 1. Schedule of treatments 
 
3.1  Experiment 1: 8-security simultaneous reverse auction 
In  Experiment  1,  bidders  compete  to  sell  their  symmetric  holdings  of  eight  securities  to  the 
Treasury. Two formats are used: 
  Simultaneous uniform-price sealed-bid auction (“sealed-bid auction”). Bidders simultaneously 
submit supply curves for each of the eight securities. Supply curves are non-decreasing (i.e. 
upward-sloping) step functions. The auctioneer then forms the aggregate supply curve and 
crosses  it  with  the  Treasury’s  pre-announced  and  fixed  demand.  The  clearing  price  is  the 
lowest-rejected offer. All quantity offered below the clearing price is sold at the clearing price. 
Quantity offered at the clearing price is rationed to balance supply and demand, using the 
proportionate rationing rule
7. 
  Simultaneous  descending  clock  auction (“clock  auction”). The eight securities are  auctioned 
simultaneously over multiple rounds. In each round, there is a price “clock” that indicates the 
                                                            
7 The proportionate rationing rule only plays a role in the event that multiple bidders make reductions at the 
clearing price. The rule then accepts the reductions at the clearing price in proportion to the size of each bidder’s 
reduction at the clearing price. Thus, if a reduction of 300 is needed to clear the market and two bidders made 
reductions of 400 and 200 at the clearing price, then the reductions are rationed proportionately: the first is 
reduced by 200 and the second is reduced by 100. The actual reduction of the first bidder is twice as large as the 
second bidder, since the first bidder’s reduction as bid is twice as large as the second bidder’s reduction. 
Order of Treatment: First Second Third Fourth
Auction Type Sealed-bid Sealed-bid Clock Clock
# of bidders 4 8 4 8
reference prices NA NA NA NA
Auction Type Sealed-bid Clock Sealed-bid Clock
# of bidders 8 8 8 8
reference prices More precise More precise Less precise Less precise
Auction Type Sealed-bid Clock Sealed-bid Clock
# of bidders 8 8 8 8
reference prices Less precise Less precise More precise More precise
Auction Type Sealed-bid Clock Sealed-bid Clock
# of bidders 4 4 4 4
reference prices NA NA NA NA
Auction Type Sealed-bid Clock Sealed-bid Clock
# of bidders 8 8 8 8










start of round price and end of round price per unit of quantity. Bidders express the quantities 
they wish to supply at prices they select below the start of round price and above the end of 
round price.  At the conclusion of each round, bidders learn the aggregate supply for each 
security. In subsequent rounds, the price is decremented for each security  that has excess 
supply, and bidders again express the quantities they wish to supply at the new prices. This 
process repeats until supply is made equal to demand. The tentative prices and assignments 
then become final. Details of the design are presented in Ausubel and Cramton (2008). 
Six sessions were dedicated to Experiment 1 to test the following three auction attributes: 1) the 
effect of sealed-bid vs. clock formats; 2) the effect of liquidity needs; and 3) the effect of increased 
competition. In sessions 1-4, we conducted paired sealed-bid and clock auctions with both low and high 
levels  of  competition  (a  total  of  four  bidders  competed  in  low-competition  auctions,  while  eight 
competed in a high-competition auctions). Sessions 9-10 were similar, except that bidders did not have 
liquidity needs. That is, subjects were not given a bonus based on the sale of securities during the 
auction. Instead, a subject’s take-home pay was based entirely on the profits they made when they sold 
a security to the government for more than its true value. We focused on the low-competition case in 
sessions 9-10, substituting an extra pair of 4-bidder auctions in place of the 8-bidder auctions. As a result 
of this schedule in sessions 9 and 10, we effectively gave players four auction pairs (sealed-bid and 
clock) of learning in two consecutive days, focused only on the 4-bidder auction. 
The experimental design was intended to facilitate a direct comparison of the sealed-bid auction 
and the clock auction. Before each sealed-bid auction, each bidder learned the realizations of one or 
more random variables that were relevant to the value of the securities that she owned. The same 
realizations of the random variables applied to the clock auction immediately following the sealed-bid. 
Thus, in successive pairs of experimental auctions, the securities had the same values and the bidders 
had the same information. Bidders were not provided with any information about the outcome of a 
given sealed-bid auction before the following clock auction, in order to avoid influencing the behavior in 
the clock auction.
8 
The  value  of  each  security  in  cents  on  the  dollar  is  the  average  of  eight  iid  random  variables 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 100: 
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where a bidder’s private information about security s is the realization uis. This is true both for the 8-
bidder and 4-bidder auctions, so that only the first four draws are revealed in the 4-bidder auction. This 
design allowed the true values to have the same distribution in both 4-bidder and 8-bidder auctions 
which caused the private information to have the same precision. 
A bidder profits by selling securities to the Treasury at prices above the securities’ true values. 
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where the quantity sold is qs of security s at the price ps. 
                                                            
8  Observe  that,  inherently,  information  about  a  clock  auction  must  be  revealed,  as  bidders  learn  aggregate 
information about Round 1 before the start of Round 2, etc. Thus, it would have been impossible to run the sealed-
bid auctions after the clock auctions without influencing the behavior in the sealed-bid auctions. 10 
 
In sessions 1-4, bidders also have a need for liquidity. The sale of securities to the Treasury is the 
source of a bidder’s liquidity. The liquidity need, Li, is drawn iid from the uniform distribution on the 
interval [250, 750]. Bidders know their own liquidity need, but not that of the other bidders. Bidders 
receive a bonus of $1 for every dollar of sales to the Treasury up to their liquidity need of Li. Bidders do 
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In  each  session,  two  auctions  were  selected  at  random  (one  from  each  pair  of  auctions)  to 
determine bidders’ take-home earnings. We used a conversion factor of $1 in take-home pay for every 
$10 million in experimental earnings. 
Given the relatively tractable theoretical nature of the experimental setup without the liquidity 
constraint, we calculated a benchmark bid based on equilibrium bidding strategies in a common value 
auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982): 
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These Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are based on a theoretical framework that differs from 
our experiment in two  ways:  1) they ignore any  behavioral  adjustments  resulting from the liquidity 
bonus; and 2) they assume that bidders sell their holdings to the Treasury as an indivisible block (i.e. 
either their entire endowment or nothing). Despite that, the benchmark strategies provide guidance in a 
static or dynamic setting. As a result, these strategies were explained to bidders and made operational 
in a bidding tool (i.e., the bidding tool facilitated updating of the strategy following a drop in supply by 
backwardly inducting the values of the bidder who reduced their supply). Assuming all players play the 
benchmark strategy, we simulated both the sealed-bid and clock auctions under the two competition 
levels.  These  simulations  provide  an  expected  clearing  price  for  each  of  the  8  securities  as  well  as 
bidder-specific profits and payoffs. While in the experimental auction we anticipated that the liquidity 
bonus would be likely to cause players to bid more aggressively than predicted by the benchmark, this 
behavioral change was not included in our simulations. 
3.2  Experiment 2: pooled security reverse auction 
In the reference price auctions, the holdings of the eight individual securities are too concentrated 
for there to be competitive auctions on a security-by-security basis. Think of a reverse auction for apples 
and oranges. In a simultaneous auction all bidders would submit bids to sell apples and oranges at the 
same time—apple-bids would compete against other apple bids and orange-bids would compete against 
other orange-bids. The result of the auction would be two separate clearing prices, one for apples and 11 
 
one for oranges. In a pooled-fruit auction apple-bids would compete against other apple-bids and all the 
orange-bids. Since apples and oranges are clearly different fruits, in order to consider the relative merit 
of apple-bids and orange-bids the auctioneer would state a price that she believes to be a fair price for 
apples (say $0.50), as well as a price that she believes to be a fair price for oranges (say $0.75). Bids are 
then ranked according to the discount on the estimated value, so that an apple-bid of $0.50 (a discount 
ratio of 1) would rank as more expensive than an orange-bid of $0.60 (a discount ratio of 0.8). 
The defining features of the pooled auction are as follows: 
  The clearing prices for different securities (i.e., securities with different CUSIP numbers) are 
determined within the same auction; 
  Bidder endowment and thus price signals are asymmetric for each security; 
  Before an auction, the Treasury determines and announces its estimate of the value of each 
security—these are referred to as reference prices; 
  The prices in the sealed-bid auction, or in each round of the descending-clock auction, are 
expressed as a percentage of the reference price for each security—these are referred to as 
price points; and 
  Clearing occurs when the cost of purchasing the securities offered at a given price point equals 
the budget allocated for the auction. 
As in Experiment 1, two auction formats are considered: 
  Simultaneous uniform-price sealed-bid. Bidders simultaneously submit supply curves for each of 
the securities within the pool. Supply curves are upward-sloping step functions, where prices 
are expressed as price points (a percentage of the reference price) and quantities are expressed 
in dollars of face value. The auctioneer then forms the aggregate supply curve and equates it 
with  the  Treasury’s  demand.  The  clearing  price  is  the  lowest  rejected  offer.  All  securities 
offered at price points below the clearing price point are purchased at the clearing price point. 
Securities offered at exactly the clearing price point are rationed by a proportional rationing 
rule. 
  Simultaneous descending-clock. There is a price “clock” indicating the current range of price 
points. For example, in Round 1, bidders express the quantities that they wish to supply of each 
security at all price points from 106% to 102% of the respective reference price for securities 
within that auction. After Round 1, the auctioneer aggregates the individual bids and informs 
bidders of the aggregate quantity that was offered at 102%. Assuming that supply exceeded 
demand, the price is decremented; for example, in Round 2, bidders may express the quantities 
that they wish to supply of each security at all price points from 102% to 98% of the respective 
reference prices. The process is repeated, with the price decremented, bids submitted and 
quantities  aggregated,  until  supply  is  made  equal  to  demand.  Then,  as  in  the  sealed-bid 
auction, all securities offered at price points below the clearing price point are purchased at the 
clearing price point, and bids at exactly the clearing price point are rationed by a proportional 
rationing rule. 
Details of the designs are described in Ausubel and Cramton (2008). 
Six sessions were dedicated to test the following three auction attributes: 1) the effect of sealed-bid 
vs. clock auction format; 2) the effect of the liquidity bonus; and 3) the effect of increasing precision 
with respect to the reference price. In sessions 5-8, we ran a low precision sealed-bid and clock auction 12 
 
and  high  precision  sealed-bid  and  clock  auction  (four  auctions  total)  in  that  order
9.  Thus  bidders 
completed four auction pairs (sealed-bid and clock) for each of the low precision and high precision 
auctions (one pair of each precision level each day). In sessions 5 and 6, we removed the liquidity bonus 
and ran two low precision sealed-bid and clock auctions per session for a total of four auctions in each 
session. As a result, we effectively gave players four auction pairs (sealed-bid and clock) of learning in 
two days, but only with the low precision auction. 
Table 2. Holdings of securities by bidder and security in million $ of face value 
      High-Quality Securities  Low-Quality Securities    
      H1  H2  H3  H4  L1  L2  L3  L4  Total 
Bidder 
1  20  0  0  0  0  5  5  10  40 
2  0  20  0  0  10  0  5  5  40 
3  0  0  20  0  5  10  0  5  40 
4  0  0  0  20  5  5  10  0  40 
5  0  5  5  10  20  0  0  0  40 
6  10  0  5  5  0  20  0  0  40 
7  5  10  0  5  0  0  20  0  40 
8  5  5  10  0  0  0  0  20  40 
   Total  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40    
  
Expected 
price  75  75  75  75  25  25  25  25    
  
Expected 
value  30  30  30  30  10  10  10  10    
   Total value  120  40    
 
Bidder endowments for each security are described in Table 2. Each bidder had an endowment of 
$40 million of face value, divided differently across securities. Similarly, there are $40 million of face 
value for each security. Treasury has a demand for 25% of the total face value within each pool of 
securities, which might be involve the purchase of one or more individual securities. 
The value of each high-quality security s  {H1,H2,H3,H4} in cents on the dollar is the average of n 
iid random variables uniformly distributed between 50 and 100: 
1
1
, where  ~ [50,100].
n
s js js iid n
j
v u u U

   
The value of each low-quality security s  {L1,L2,L3,L4} in cents on the dollar is the average of n iid 
random variables uniformly distributed between 0 and 50: 
1
1
, where  ~ [0,50].
n
s js js iid n
j
v u u U

   
                                                            
9 See footnote 5. , In sessions 5 and 7, the more precise sealed bid and clock auctions were conducted first. In 
sessions 6 and 8, the less precise sealed bid and clock auctions were conducted first. 13 
 
For auctions with more precise reference prices, n = 16; for auctions with less precise reference 










   
Thus,  the  reference  price  is  based  on  eight  realizations  in  the  more  precise  case  (1/2  of  all 
realizations) and on four realizations in the less precise case (1/3 of all realizations). Reference prices are 
made public before each auction starts. 
For  each  $5  million  of  security  holdings,  bidder  i  receives  as  private  information  one  of  the 
realizations ujs. Thus, bidder 1, who holds $20 million of security 1, gets four realizations (see Table 2). In 
this way, those with larger holdings have more precise information about the security’s value. Observe 
that this specification requires the holders of each given security to receive collectively a total of eight 
realizations. Since there are eight realizations available (besides the ones that form the reference price), 
each of the realizations ujs (i = 1, …, 8) can be observed by exactly one bidder. 
Suppose that the auction clearing price-point is pH for the high-quality pool and pL for the low-
quality pool, where the price-point in the auction is stated as a fraction of the reference price. Then ps = 
pH rs for s  {H1,H2,H3,H4} and ps = pL rs for s  {L1,L2,L3,L4}. 
If a bidder sells the quantity qs of the security s at the price ps, then profit is 
1
100 ( , , ) ( ) , i i s s is
s
p q v p v q     
where the 1/100 factor converts cents into dollars. As with Experiment 1, when bidders have a liquidity 
need (sessions 5-8), it is drawn iid from the uniform distribution. In Experiment 2, however, the cash 
scale is increased, and thus liquidity needs are drawn from the interval [2500, 7500]. Each bidder knows 
his own liquidity need, but not that of the other bidders. The bidder receives a bonus of $1 for every 
dollar of sales to the Treasury up to his liquidity need: 
1





   






(2 ) if  
( , , )
( ) otherwise
s s is s is i
ss
ii
i s s is
s
p v q p q L
U p q v








Thus, an additional dollar of cash is worth two dollars when the bidder’s liquidity need is not 
satisfied, but is worth one dollar when the liquidity need is satisfied. To be roughly comparable to 
Experiment 1, bidder’s take-home pay was calculated such that they received $1 in take-home pay for 
every $100,000 in experimental earnings. 
Unlike Experiment 1, there is no Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for a similar auction 
that we can use as a benchmark. The reference price auction is beyond current theory. The pooling of 
securities combined with the use of reference prices violates monotonicity in signals, meaning that a 
higher signal does not necessarily translate to a higher bid. Monotonicity between signals and value 
exists within a particular security (i.e., ceteris paribus, a higher signal suggests a higher value); however, 
there is no monotonicity across securities within a particular pool. 14 
 
Monotonicity  holds  when  a  higher  signal  implies  a  higher  expected  value  to  the  bidder.  This 
relationship is broken by the existence of the reference price. Consider that a security with a higher 
reference price has a higher expected value to each bidder, all else equal. Holding the common value of 
a security fixed, bidders prefer a higher reference price, since a high reference price makes the security 
more competitive in the pool. Thus, in determining her bid, a bidder must consider the countervailing 
forces of signals and reference prices. It is difficult to recommend how a bidder should respond to a high 
signal with a low reference price, a low signal with a high reference price, etc. 
3.3  Experimental subjects 
The training of subjects and all experimental sessions took place in the Experimental Lab of the 
University of Maryland’s Economics Department. This is a new state-of-the-art facility for conducting 
economic experiments. Each subject has her own private cubical with computer and necessary software. 
The  subject  pool  consisted  of  Ph.D.  students  at  the  University  of  Maryland  and  George  Mason 
University. The students had taken or are taking an advanced graduate course in game theory and 
auction theory, and are pursuing degrees in economics, business, computer science, or engineering. 
In  each  session  of  approximately  three  hours,  16  bidders,  out  of  a  total  subject  pool  of  19, 
participated in four auctions. Each auction consisted of four or eight bidders (i.e., there were always 
multiple auctions conducted in parallel) and the bidders were randomly and anonymously matched. 
Bidders’ payoffs consisted of the sum of two terms. First, each bidder received trading profits 
according to the difference between the common value, v, of the security, and the price, p, at which the 
bidder’s securities were purchased. Hence, if the bidder sold a quantity, q, of securities, the bidder’s 
trading profits equaled: q(p—v). Second, each bidder was randomly assigned a liquidity need, L, and 
received an additional dollar of payoff for each dollar in sales, qp, up to L that the bidder received in a 
given auction. 
At the conclusion of all sessions, each subject received a check equal to a show-up fee of $22 per 
session plus an amount proportional to her total experimental payoff as described above. Average take-
home pay was $100.43 per session. 
The next section describes the results. 
4  Experimental results 
The  primary  results  comparing  sealed-bid  and  clock  aspects  of  the  two  experiments  are 
summarized in Tables 3-6. First considering just the results from Experiment 1 with the liquidity bonus, 
we see that even though clearing price and profits are statistically indistinguishable between the two 
auction formats, the variability of profit is much higher in the sealed-bid auction compared to the clock. 
Thus the results from the clock auction would appear to be more stable and predictable. Treasury would 
appear to best satisfy their first objective to consistently get the best possible price for the taxpayers 
using a clock auction, though the difference is small. This is particularly important when a liquidity bonus 
is in effect; without the liquidity bonus (Table 4) profits are statistically greater than zero and the clock 
profits are significantly higher for the clock auction (178) relative to the sealed-bid auction (118) with 
negligible differences between the standard deviation. 15 
 
Table 3. Comparison of mean outcomes by auction type in Experiment 1 with liquidity bonus 
 
Table 4. Comparison of mean outcomes by auction type in Experiment 1 without liquidity bonus 
 
Turning to Treasury’s second objective related to buying assets from those banks most in need of 
liquidity, we examine the payoffs from the two auction formats. Payoffs are significantly higher under 
the clock auction (453) compared to the sealed bid (388). We also see that the variability of total payoffs 
is higher under the sealed-bid auction than the clock which supports the premise that the additional 
information provided by the clock auction format leads to more consistent, less variable outcomes. 
Once again, Treasury is best served in achieving their second objective with a clock auction. 
Turning to Experiment 2 with liquidity need, we see that there is no difference in the clearing price 
between the two auction formats and while the profits are lower in the clock auction (-799) compared 
to the sealed-bid auction (-693), the difference is not significant. In addition, there is not a significant 
variation in the standard deviation of the profit. This result is mimicked in Table 6 when the liquidity 













Note: mean value is shown with standard error in parentheses
Liquidity Bonus
Clock liquidity bonus is significantly larger than sealed-bid liquidity 





The clearing price is statistically indistinguishable for the Clock and 
Sealed Bid auction (t-test p-value of 0.3621)
Profit
Profits are statistically indistinguishable between the two auction 
formats (t-test p-value of 0.3135)
Standard Deviation of 
Profit
239.3 175.8
Higher standard deviation of profit in sealed-bid than clock (variance 
ratio test p-value 0.0006)
Payoff
Clock payoff is significantly higher than sealed-bid payoff (t-test p-value 
of 0.0400)
Standard Deviation of 
Payoff
281.7 221.5
Higher standard deviation of payoff in sealed-bid than clock (variance 
ratio test p-value 0.0071)
Overshooting the 
liquidity need
Overshooting the liquidity need is almost significantly less in clock than 










The clearing price is signficantly higher for the Clock auction (t-test p-
value of 0.0004)
Clearing Price
Standard Deviation of 
Payoff
119.1 113.3
Standard deviation of payoff in sealed-bid is statistically identical to that 
of clock (variance ratio test p-value 0.6919)
Profit = Payoff
Profits are significantly greater than zero in both cases, and are 
significantly higher in the Clock auction (t-test p-value of 0.0041)16 
 
Table 5. Comparison of mean outcomes by auction type in Experiment 2 with liquidity bonus 
 
Table 6. Comparison of mean outcomes by auction type in Experiment 2 without liquidity bonus 
 
However, when the liquidity bonus is included in the analysis (Table 5), we see that the mean 
payoff  under  the  clock  auction  (3,718)  is  significantly  higher  than  the  payoff  under  the  sealed-bid 
auction (3,222). Moreover, the standard deviation of payoff is higher under the sealed-bid and the 
magnitude by which experimental subjects overshot their liquidity need was higher in the sealed bid 
(1,984 sealed bid overshoot and 905 clock overshoot). Both of these results suggest that the clock 
auction is a more efficient and accurate means of helping the Treasury determine which banks are most 
in need of liquidity and allowing the banks to best manage their need for liquidity. 
In the following two sections we discuss in more detail the econometric analysis of the data. 
4.1  Experiment 1: simultaneous descending clock 
The baseline regression results demonstrating the effect of liquidity and learning across the six 
sessions of auctions in Experiment 1 are shown in Table 7. There are three striking results from this 
table. First, we see the results described in Tables 3-6: the profit between the sealed bid and clock 
auction (regression 2) is statistically identical; whereas, when the liquidity bonus is zero, bidders earn a 
significantly higher profit in the clock auction ($60). Theory predicts that without the liquidity bonus, the 
expected payoff from the clock and sealed bid auctions should be identical, though the sealed bid is 
likely to have higher profit variance. This is not borne out in the results and may be because additional 
information made available to bidders in the clock auction facilitated tacit collusion. In the auctions with 












Note: mean value is shown with standard error in parentheses
Liquidity Bonus
Clock liquidity bonus is significantly larger than sealed-bid liquidity 





The clearing pricepoint is signficantly indistinguishable between the two 
auction formats (t-test p-value of 0.3485)
Profit
Profits are significantly less than zero in both cases, but no significant 
difference in mean profits (t-test p-value of 0.1680)
Standard Deviation of 
Profit
574.1 645.2
No significant difference in the standard deviation on profit in clock 
compared to sealed-bid (variance ratio test p-value 0.1896)
Payoff
Clock payoff is significantly higher than sealed-bid payoff (t-test p-value 
of 0.0083)
Standard Deviation of 
Payoff
1653.5 1311.9
Higher standard deviation of payoff in sealed-bid than clock (variance 
ratio test p-value 0.0095)
Overshooting the 
liquidity need







Note: mean value is shown with standard error in parentheses
Clearing Price
The clearing pricepoint is signficantly indistinguishable between the two 





Profits are significantly greater than zero, and are almost significantly 
higher in the Clock auction (t-test p-value of 0.1215)
Standard Deviation of 
Payoff
309.7 303.5
Standard deviation of payoff in sealed-bid is statistically identical to that 
of clock (variance ratio test p-value 0.8739)17 
 
When  the  liquidity bonus  is  included in  the  payoff, the  clock  auction generates  significantly higher 
payoffs ($65) relative to the sealed bid auction. 
Table 7. Experiment 1 regression results with experimental subject fixed effects 
 
The second observation from Table 7 is the large influence the liquidity bonus has on payoffs. For 
every $1 in liquidity bonus, payoffs are increased by a statistically significant $0.74, while profits are 
reduced by an insignificant $0.15. The positive effect on payoffs and negative effect on profits are 
expected as a higher liquidity bonus should motivate players to bid more aggressively on some of their 
securities,  driving  the  profits  negative  on  those  securities,  but  securing  a  positive  payoff  with  the 
liquidity bonus. Given that liquidity bonus is directly added to a bidder’s payoff, the coefficient on the 
liquidity bonus can be interpreted as the percentage of the bonus captured by bidders; overall bidders 
captured 74% of their liquidity bonus over the four days. 
Finally, Table 7 illustrates the effect of learning. Between sessions 1-3 when there was a positive 
liquidity bonus, we see that payoffs and profits steadily increased. Specifically, Session 2’s payoffs were 
$183 greater than Session 1 and Session 3’s payoffs were an additional $100 greater than Session 2. 
With respect to profit, Session 2’s profits were $124 greater than Session 1 and Session 3’s profits were 
an additional $88 greater than  Session 2.  In  Session 4, however, the effect on learning appears to 
change. There is not a statistically significant difference between Session 4 and Session 3 in either the 
profit or payoff measure, which suggests that participants had learned all they could during the first 3 
sessions. Alternatively, it could be the case that in Session 4 players were still learning, but because 
everyone was optimally responding to each other, there was no change in payoffs or profits. 
Liquidity=0
(1) (2) (3)
dep var: payoff profit profit=payoff
Liquidity 0.740*** -0.159*
[0.0855] [0.0879]
Session 2 183.4*** 123.9***
[44.03] [35.68]
Session 3 283.9*** 211.7***
[47.04] [35.56]





Clock 65.39*** 26.51 60.13***
[16.36] [24.31] [16.08]
_cons -147.2** -93.30* 88.66***
[54.83] [51.58] [16.64]
Subject FE Yes Yes Yes
N 256 256 128
adj. R-sq 0.42 0.14 0.30
Robust standard errors in brackets; * p<0.1 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
Liquidity >018 
 
The effect of learning is reversed when the liquidity bonus is set to zero. This is demonstrated in 
Regression  3.  We  see  that  players  in  auction  pair  1  and  2  during  Session  9  earned  a  statistically 
significant $59 more than during auction pair 1 and 2 of Session 10. We consider this result below in the 
discussion of Table 9. 
Table 8. Dependent variable = payoff; clustered standard errors 
 
These results are further reinforced in Table 8 where we explore the effect of competition and the 
expected payoff on actual payoffs. The most striking result in Table 8 is that increasing competition in 
both the sealed bid and clock auctions results in a higher expected payoff for all players. Using the 
coefficients in Table 8, the incremental payoff for the various auctions are as follows (assuming x payoff 
in the 4-person Sealed Bid auction): 
  8-person Sealed Bid auction: x + $239.70 
Liquidity=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff
Liquidity 0.740*** 0.810*** 0.810*** 0.875***
[0.0855] [0.0594] [0.0595] [0.0609]
Session 1 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Session 2 183.4*** 186.2*** 186.2*** 188.8***
[44.03] [43.97] [44.06] [43.30]
Session 3 283.9*** 285.4*** 285.4*** 290.9***
[47.04] [47.14] [47.23] [48.74]
Session 4 250.0*** 249.7*** 249.7*** 252.4***
[33.52] [34.87] [34.94] [34.70]
Session 9 0 0 0 0 65.85*
[0] [0] [0] [0] [29.60]
Session 10 0 0 0 0 omitted
[0] [0] [0] [0]
Clock 65.39*** 65.39*** 119.6** 65.34*** 59.09**
[16.36] [16.39] [31.78] [16.34] [16.08]






_cons -147.2* -274.2*** -301.3*** -265.9*** 193.9***
[54.83] [43.63] [47.67] [42.81] [30.30]
Subject FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 256 256 256 128
adj. R-sq 0.419 0.552 0.551 0.315
Standard errors in brackets clustered on subjects; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001
Liquidity >019 
 
  4-person Clock auction: x + $119.60 
  8-person Clock auction: x + $251.00 
This competition benefit can be explained in the clock auction by the fact that players are learning 
information about all eight signals. That is, there are eight signals drawn for both auctions but in the 4-
person auction four of those signals are not represented by any players. Thus it is impossible for players 
to learn anything about those four signals. As a result, the 8-player clock auction reveals much more 
information about the common value for each security than the 4-player clock auction which results in 
higher player payoff. 
We also see that going from four to eight bidders in the sealed-bid auction increases payoffs. There 
is no theoretical support for this finding and thus we suggest that it is an experimental artifact. It is likely 
caused by the fact that four of the eight drawn signals were not observed by any player and thus all of 
the possible outcomes (from the eight signals) were not represented in the outcomes.  
Table 8 also illustrates that there is no correlation between actual payoff and expected payoff (i.e., 
simulated payoff), independent of liquidity. To further explore this result, we consider the interaction of 
expected payoff and session-specific effects for the zero liquidity experiments in Sessions 9 and 10. 
These results, shown in Table 9, illustrate that while there is no correlation between actual and expected 
payoff during Session 9, there is a weakly-significant correlation in Session 10 (significant at the 9% 
threshold). Thus it appears that players deviated from the benchmark during Session 9, causing some 
players to experience larger profits, but reduced their deviation during Session 10, lowering average 
profits. 
Table 9. Dependent variable = payoff; clustered standard errors 
 
Tables 10 and 11 illustrate the effects of adding various additional fixed effects to the regressions 
presented before for the auctions with liquidity and those without liquidity, respectively. Specifically, we 
include competitor fixed effects, which control for the effect of playing against specific opponents in the 
various auctions and subject*session fixed effects, which control for subject learning over the testing 
period. Table 10 demonstrates that during Sessions 1-4, adding competitor fixed effects reduces the 
effect of liquidity in determining the payoff and dampens the effect of learning. Table 11, shows a 













Subject FE Yes Yes
N 64 64
adj. R-sq 0.385 0.633
Standard errors in brackets clustered on subjects; 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001
Liquidity=020 
 
importance of liquidity in determining total payoff. This suggests that over time, players got better at 
optimally managing their liquidity bonus. 
Table 10. Dependent variable = payoff for only sessions 1-4; clustered standard errors 
 
Table 11. Dependent variable = payoff for only sessions 5-6; clustered standard errors 
 
4.2  Experiment 2: pooled securities 
Table  12  reinforces  the  conclusions  from  Tables  5-7  for  the  Pooled  security  setting.  The  clock 
auction  format  creates  no  statistically  significant  change  in  profit,  but  does  increase  the  payoff 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff
liquidity 0.740*** 0.810*** 0.875*** 0.761*** 0.761*** 0.809*** 0.791*** 0.891*** 0.928***
[0.0855] [0.0594] [0.0609] [0.0679] [0.0679] [0.110] [0.127] [0.0930] [0.0795]
Session 1 omitted omitted omitted
Session 2 183.4*** 186.2*** 188.8*** 385.5* 385.5* 397.8*
[44.03] [43.97] [43.30] [151.2] [151.2] [150.2]
Session 3 283.9*** 285.4*** 290.9*** 522.0** 522.0** 528.1**
[47.04] [47.14] [48.74] [145.6] [145.6] [143.8]
Session 4 250.0*** 249.7*** 252.4*** 440.7** 440.7** 440.8**
[33.52] [34.87] [34.70] [142.5] [142.5] [141.9]
Clock 65.39*** 65.39*** 65.34*** 65.39** 65.39** 65.35** 65.39** 65.39** 65.36**
[16.36] [16.39] [16.34] [17.01] [17.01] [16.99] [17.93] [17.97] [17.98]
8_Bidders 185.6*** 190.8*** 935.7 777.4 187.9*** 191.1***
[28.33] [29.24] [914.7] [954.3] [32.52] [32.74]
e_payoff -0.0914 -0.0737 -0.0574
[0.0648] [0.134] [0.0955]
_cons -147.2* -274.2*** -265.9*** -545.2*** 156.6 41.62 -222.1** -372.2*** -291.7***
[54.83] [43.63] [42.81] [135.5] [716.1] [741.0] [73.70] [63.99] [59.08]
Subject FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competitor FE Yes Yes Yes
Subject*Session FE Yes Yes Yes
N 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
adj. R-sq 0.419 0.552 0.552 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.407 0.569 0.568
Standard errors in brackets clustered on subjects; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff
Session 9 58.82 65.85* 26.71 35.74
[30.03] [29.60] [18.06] [20.68]
Session 10 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Clock 60.13** 59.09** 60.13** 59.34** 60.13** 58.65**
[16.08] [16.08] [16.92] [16.92] [17.07] [17.30]
e_payoff 0.156 0.119 0.223
[0.116] [0.0799] [0.178]
_cons 88.66*** 75.71*** 76.67* 75.43* 94.37*** 75.72***
[16.64] [17.51] [34.71] [35.26] [8.534] [15.74]
Subject FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competitor FE Yes Yes
Subject*Session FE Yes Yes
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
adj. R-sq 0.299 0.315 0.649 0.657 0.447 0.471
Standard errors in brackets clustered on subjects; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.00121 
 
significantly. That is, the clock auction format is more efficient at helping Treasury determine which 
banks are most in need of liquidity. Also in Table 12 we see that the bidders are able to capture slightly 
less (61%) of their liquidity bonus on average than in Experiment 1 (74%). Similar to Experiment 1, Table 
12 demonstrates that a larger liquidity bonus caused players to bid more aggressively resulting in a 
statistically  significant  lower  profit.  This  strategy  is  reflected  in  the  individually  reported  strategies 
summarized in Appendix A. 
Table 12. Experiment 2: Pooled security reverse auction 
 
The effect of learning over the first four sessions of Experiment 2 is somewhat more complicated 
than in Experiment 1. That is, the payoffs in Sessions 6-8 are statistically indistinguishable from Session 
5. However, we observe a statistically insignificant decline in profits between Sessions 5, 6, and 7 and a 
dramatic  and  significant  decline  between  Session  7  and  Session  8  (-$566).  This  decline  in  profits 
between Session 7 and Session 8 is matched by a statistically significant decline in payoffs between 
(decline of $642, significant at the 99% level). This suggests that participants played significantly more 
aggressively during Session 8, but to their own detriment. During the days with no liquidity bonus, it 
appears that learning may have played a role, albeit a weak one. The payoff during Session 11 was $85 
less than Session 12 and significant at the 93% level. 
Table 13 provides additional insights into the process of learning by looking at the interaction 
between  the  liquidity  bonus  and  session  and  clock  and  session.  We  see  an  upward  trend  in  the 
percentage  of  the  liquidity  bonus  captured  by  participants  over  the  whole  of  Experiment  2  when 
liquidity was positive. This suggests that participants became more adept at managing their liquidity 
(1) (2) (3)
dep var: payoff profit payoff=profit
Liquidity 0.606*** -0.119***
[0.0545] [0.0217]
Session 5 omitted omitted
Session 6 189.9 -120.8
[220.0] [87.43]
Session 7 326.4 -225.6*
[219.8] [87.37]









Subject FE Yes Yes Yes
N 256 256 128
adj. R-sq 0.364 0.388 0.265
Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.00122 
 
constraint over time. In addition, we see a negative trend in the benefit of clock compared to sealed-bid. 
This  suggests  that  participants  determined  a  strategy  in  early  rounds  and  played  that  strategy 
independent  of  other  bidders’  actions.  That  is,  initially  when  participants  were  unfamiliar  with  the 
pooled auction setting, the additional information revealed during the clock auction increased payoffs 
by a statistically significant $1,030. This benefit of the clock declined over time independent of the 
presence of liquidity. 
Table 13. Payoffs over time 
 
The final result from Table 12 is that we see no statistically significant effect with respect to the 
more or less precise case. That is, providing bidders with reference prices that represent 25% or 50% of 
the total signals does not result in a significant change in payoff. As might be expected, the more precise 
cases appear to result in slightly higher payoffs ($45), but not statistically so. And when we look at the 
effect of the more or less precise case by day (Table 13), we again do not see a statistically significant 
affect or trend. 
Given that there was not a tractable theoretical benchmark strategy with which to provide the 
auction  participants,  participants  were  forced  to  determine  their  own  bidding  strategies.  At  the 
conclusion of the auction all participants provided a short synopsis of their strategies (see Appendix A). 
Participants  described strategies that were heavily determined by their liquidity draws and ratio of 
private signals to reference prices. Using this information, we calculated an applied bidder strategy 
(ABS) ratio that appears to capture the substance of how bidders used their private information. This 
applied bidder strategy (ABS) ratio is calculated as follows: 





sig u sig E v
b
ref
   

  
where  sig  is the number of private signals given to each player for security i ,  is u  is the average of 
those private signals and    is Ev  is the expected value of the unknown signals given the known uniform 
distribution  for  securities  in  that  pool  type  (75  for  high  quality  securities  and  25  for  low  quality 
securities). Finally,  i ref  is the reference price for security i which is given to all players. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Session 5 Session 6 Session 7 Session 8 Session 11 Session 12
dep var: payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff payoff
Liquidity 0.555* 0.647*** 0.637*** 0.727** 0 0
[0.197] [0.147] [0.0769] [0.201] [0] [0]
Clock 1030.1** 846.9* 224.3 -114.5 108.4** 60.57*
[265.4] [379.1] [231.5] [278.0] [29.05] [24.91]
LessPrecise 200.9 -266.2 -139.4 -0.490 0 0
[407.1] [320.5] [228.3] [267.6] [0] [0]
_cons -39.38 -28.80 466.0 -548.4 105.8*** 214.4***
[1118.1] [863.5] [428.8] [965.0] [14.53] [12.45]
Subject FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 64 64 64 64 64 64
adj. R-sq 0.625 0.564 0.749 0.655 0.443 0.61
Standard errors in brackets clustered on subjects; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.00123 
 
Table 14 illustrates that when the lowest ABS ratio for participants was low (i.e., ABS ratio < 0.7) 
bidders did significantly better than when the lowest ABS ratio was higher, independent of the presence 
of the liquidity bonus. For example, there is not a statistically significant difference between an ABS ratio 
< 0.6 and an ABS ratio between 0.6 and 0.7. However, when the ABS ratio is between 0.7 and 0.8, 
payoffs fall by a statistically significant $906. When the ABS ratio rises above 0.8, payoffs are $674 to 
$780 lower than when the ABS ratio is less than 0.6.  
Table 14. Effect of the lowest applied bidder strategy ratio on outcomes* 
 
(1) (2) (3)
dep var: payoff profit payoff=profit
Liquidity 0.604*** -0.121*** 0
[0.0753] [0.0224] [0]
Session 5 omitted omitted 0
[0]
Session 6 150.7 -76.16 0
[401.8] [114.3] [0]
Session 7 357.7 -172.3 0
[316.6] [130.4] [0]
Session 8 -336.7 -729.9*** 0
[276.8] [145.4] [0]
Session 11 0 0 0.893
[0] [0] [53.35]
Session 12 0 0 omitted
[0] [0]
Clock 496.7* -105.5* 84.49
[199.4] [47.92] [49.80]
LessPrecise -73.33 42.52 0
[148.4] [69.51] [0]
ABS<0.6 omitted omitted omitted
0.6 ≤ ABS < 0.7 -546.9 15.88 -135.1
[377.6] [139.3] [115.1]
0.7 ≤ ABS < 0.8 -905.8** -105.3 -267.7*
[254.3] [96.79] [111.8]
0.8 ≤ ABS < 0.9 -674.4* -93.38 -329.5**
[261.3] [102.3] [110.3]
0.9 ≤ ABS < 1 -780.8*** -340.0*** -502.3***
[189.4] [63.61] [120.2]
1 ≤ ABS  -749.2** -528.6** -361.7
[258.7] [167.2] [223.1]
_cons 856.2 340.5 446.9***
[579.2] [180.3] [103.5]
Subject FE Yes Yes No
N 256 256 128
adj. R-sq 0.410 0.476 0.165
Standard errors in brackets clustered on subjects when subject FE used; 
* The ABS ratio was calculated for each security and the lowest was used 24 
 
5  Recombining the sealed-bid results 
Although we held only four sessions of the 8-security simultaneous reverse auction, and thus a total 
of  four  low-competition  and  four  high-competition  auctions,  we  can  evaluate  a  rich  set  of  data  to 
determine the full range of possible outcomes from the bidding strategies employed by the subjects. To 
do this, we use a recombinant procedure.
10 The results of our recombinant analysis add strength to one 
of our major contentions—the sealed-bid format results in more varied outcomes than does the clock 
auction  format.  Further,  we  can  also  assert  that  a  few  anomalous  bids—mistakes—can  drive  the 
outcomes  of  entire  auctions  using  the  sealed-bid  format.  In  sum,  the  downside  risk  of  poor  price 
discovery and extremely low payoffs to the bidders, are higher using the sealed-bid format. 
The recombinant procedure is in principle very simple. To understand the theoretical justification, 
we present a simple example. Imagine a basic sealed-bid auction with two bidders. Suppose there are 
two of these basic auctions, auction A and auction B. Bidder 1 faces bidder 2 in auction A, while bidder 3 
faces bidder 4 in auction B. A single outcome results from each auction, giving us a total of two price 
observations, for example. Now, consider that each bidder determined their bid using only their own 
private information, and no special knowledge of their opponents. Provided bidding is anonymous, we 
can expect that bidder 1 would have submitted the same bid if she had faced bidder 3 or bidder 4, just 
as she did when she faced bidder 2 in the auction we first observed. Exploiting this concept, we can 
compute the outcomes of several more auctions than those we actually observed. The total set of 
auctions is given by the set of bids  1 2 1 3 1 4 2 3 2 4 3 4 { { , },{ , },{ , },{ , },{ , }, { , }} A b b b b b b b b b b B b b  . We get 
a total of six outcomes to analyze instead of just two.
11 
We use this procedure to examine more closely the outcomes of  the sealed-bid  simultaneous 
reverse auctions.
12 We observe a total of 1,820 4-bidder auctions per session, rather than 4, and a total 
of 12,870 8-bidder auctions per session, rather than 2. This gives us the ability to see a highly precise 
distribution of the outcomes that could have been produced by the strategies our subjects employed.
13 
The most important finding from this analysis is that  the sealed-bid procedure is vulnerable to 
anomalous bids. Strong evidence is provided in Figure 1, which shows a histogram of the results in the 4-
bidder case.  We display the difference between true common value and price, and point out the 
bimodality of the data in sessions one and three. In both of these cases, small mistakes by bidders led to 
large differences between price and the true value of the securities. This clearly hampers price 
discovery, and certainly affects the profits of the winning bidders.  Figure 2 shows the profit from the 
corresponding security sales. A heavy left tail is evident in the distribution of profits, driven again by the 
tendency of small mistakes by a few bidders to negatively influence the price of securities. Finally, note 
what happens to bidder payoffs under the same circumstances.  Extremely negative outcomes are 
                                                            
10 See Charles and Reiley (2006) for details on the recombinant estimator. 
11 In this case, we get six outcomes, or four -choose-two. In general, we can calculate the number of outcomes 
equal to n-choose-k, where n is the total number of bidders and k is the number of bidders in each auction. 
12 Note that the theoretical justification for the recombinant procedure does not hold in a clock auction, since what 
one bidder does depends importantly on the signals she receives from her competitors. Thus the assumption of 
anonymity breaks down, and we cannot justify a recombinant analysis. L ikewise, we cannot analyze reference 
price auctions this way, since bidders in different auctions react to information that is specific to the auction, and 
thus combining bids from different auctions is not theoretically or statistically valid. 
13 Note carefully that we do not claim that all of these auctions are statistically independent. We cannot calculate 
multivariate test statistics with this data, as the distribution of the standard error is unknown. Instead, we use the 
procedure to examine in some detail what is possible, had our random matching of subjects turned out differently. 25 
 
evident  in  session  one.  Even  in  sessions  two  through  four,  after  learning  has  taken  place,  there  is 
substantial mass at and below 200, substantially less than the average payoff of 388 we report in table 
2.  The  average  payoff  statistic  from  the  sealed-bid  auctions  masks  the  possibility  of  very  negative 
outcomes. The reason is simple—when a small number of bidders drive prices below their common 
value, due to poor strategy or low signals, they inhibit the ability of other bidders to satisfy their liquidity 
needs. When liquidity needs are an especially important goal of the auction, the sealed-bid format can 
result in an especially bad case of allocative inefficiency. 
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Figure 2. Profit 
 
Such  poor  outcomes  are  extremely  unlikely  under  the  clock  auction  format.  First,  mistakes  by 
bidders are simply less likely under the clock format. Since bidders have multiple chances to express 
their  preferences  and  can  continually  update  their  strategies  throughout  the  bidding  process, 
anomalous bids are less likely. Second, as the results of our econometric analysis demonstrate, bidders 
are better able to manage their liquidity needs under the clock format. Thus, should a small number of 
bidders drive the price of a handful of securities well below their common value,  the clock format 
enables other bidders to respond by adjusting their bidding on other securities. Sensible bidders will bid 
more aggressively on other securities in their portfolio in order to meet their liquidity needs, allowing 
them to recover reasonable payoffs. The sealed-bid format gives bidders no such chance to adjust their 
strategies. When liquidity needs are a dominant concern of the Treasury, the sealed-bid format leaves 
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Figure 3. Payoffs 
 
6  Analysis and discussion 
6.1  Feasibility of implementation 
One of the points in conducting the experiments was to demonstrate the feasibility and practicality 
of conducting a computerized auction in which multiple securities are purchased simultaneously. In this 
regard, both the sealed-bid and descending-clock auctions can be regarded as successfully implemented 
in a short time. 
6.2  Competitiveness of price 
Notwithstanding the presence of adverse selection, as a theoretical matter, the price in the auction 
can be driven below the security’s fundamental value to the extent that the bidders have liquidity needs 
above and beyond their objective of earning trading profits. This was demonstrated in the experiments. 
In  both  the  sealed-bid  and  descending-clock  auctions,  the  prices  were  significantly  below  the 
fundamental values of the respective securities. This is seen in the second row (profit) in Tables 3-6. A 
bidder’s mean trading profits  in Experiment 1 were negative, though not significantly so under the 
sealed-bid (-39) and clock (-13). The mean trading profits in Experiment 2 were significantly negative 
under both formats: -693 with the sealed-bid format and -799 with the clock format. 
6.3  Frequency of erroneous bids 
In a relatively small but clearly noticeable subset of the auctions, bidders submitted what were 
almost certainly unintentionally low bids (“erroneous bids”). In descending-clock auctions, the harm to a 
bidder from an erroneous bid was often fairly limited, as the extent of the damage was that the bidder 
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could be much greater. Thus, one advantage observed of the clock auction was that it helped to insulate 
bidders from the effects of their own mistakes. 
6.4  Management of liquidity needs 
If separate sealed-bid auctions are conducted simultaneously, the bidder has no way to condition 
her bidding in one auction on the amount that she is likely to win in other auctions. By contrast, if 
separate dynamic auctions are conducted simultaneously, the bidder can observe the outcome evolving 
in one auction and use that information to adjust her behavior in other auctions. Thus, the bidder has 
much greater ability to manage her liquidity need, without “overshooting” and selling more securities at 
prices below value than the bidder needs to sell. 
This is demonstrated clearly in the experimental results. Despite that the bidders had the same 
values and the same liquidity needs in the sealed-bid auctions and in the clock auctions, the bidders 
attained average payoffs in Experiment 1 (Experiment 2) of 388 (3,222) in the sealed-bid auctions and of 
453 (3,719) in the clock auctions, as shown in row 5 of Tables 3-6. The payoffs in the clock auctions were 
significantly  higher  (at  the  1%  level)  than  in  the  sealed  bid  auction.  This  is  entirely  due  to  better 
management of liquidity with the clock auction. As shown in the third row of Tables 3-6, the mean 
liquidity  bonus  in  Experiment  1  (Experiment  2)  was  significantly  larger,  466  (4,517)  with  the  clock 
format, compared with 428 (3,915) with the sealed bid format. Under sealed-bid, the bidder often 
overshoots her liquidity need. The mean overshoot in Experiment 1 (Experiment 2) with sealed-bid was 
692 (1,984), compared with 605 (905) for the clock format (see row 7 of Tables 3-6). This difference is 
significant at the 1% level (p-value of 0.0014). 
6.5  Cost of purchasing securities 
There appear to be three distinct effects determining the comparison of purchase prices between 
the sealed-bid and dynamic auction formats. First, a dynamic auction format is generally known for 
mitigating  the  winner’s  curse,  leading  to  more  aggressive  bidding  and  to  lower  prices  in  a  reverse 
auction. Second, as seen above, the bidders submit fewer erroneous bids in a dynamic format, leading 
to higher prices. Third, as seen above, a dynamic format allows bidders to manage better their liquidity 
needs; more than likely, this would lead to fewer desperation offers and cause higher prices. Combining 
these  three  effects,  the  price  comparison  between  sealed-bid  and  dynamic  auction  formats  is 
ambiguous. 
In  the  experimental  results,  the  price  difference  between  the  two  formats  is  not  statistically 
significant. The bidders, with the same values and the same liquidity needs in the two auction formats 
produced mean clearing prices of 49.57 in the clock and 47.79 in the sealed-bid auction in Experiment 1. 
In Experiment 2, the two formats produced mean clearing price points of 85.22% in the sealed-bid 
auctions and of 83.87% in the clock auctions (see row 1 of Tables 3-6). 
Combining the results on satisfying liquidity needs and on the cost of purchasing securities, the 
taxpayer would favor the descending-clock auction. While the taxpayer’s expenditure is approximately 
equal in the sealed-bid and the clock auction, the clock auction gives “more bang for the buck”—for a 
given expenditure of money, the clock auction better directs resources towards satisfying the liquidity 
needs of the banking sector. 
6.6  Variability of outcomes and informativeness of prices 
Finally, there appears to be a fundamental difference in the experimental results between the 
sealed-bid auction and the corresponding dynamic auction. All other things being equal, the outcomes 
of the sealed-bid auction are more variable and random. 29 
 
First, this means that the outcomes of the dynamic auction are more predictable, and thus more 
satisfying to  risk-averse  banks  and regulators.  The  greater variability is seen in  the  variance of the 
bidder’s payoff. The standard deviation of the bidder’s payoff in Experiment 1 (Experiment 2) is 222 
(1,312) with the clock format compared with 285 (1,654) with sealed-bid (see row 6 of Tables 3-6). This 
difference is significant at the 1% level (p-value of 0.0095). 
Second, one of the objectives of government purchases of troubled securities is to restart frozen 
secondary markets by providing relevant transaction prices. By doing so, the government can rely on the 
private market to accomplish some of the government’s objectives, reducing the need for government 
resources. The experimental design limited the extent to which this can be seen in the data, as there 
were only two separate pools of securities and thus only two independent prices determined in the 
auctions. Nevertheless, it can be seen that the prices resulting from the dynamic auction are more 
accurate,  an  effect  which  can  be  expected  to  be  enlarged  when  more  independent  prices  are 
determined by an auction. 
7  Conclusion 
We  present  our  findings  from  laboratory  experiments  of  troubled  asset  reverse  auctions.  The 
experiments demonstrate the feasibility of implementing a purchase program for troubled assets in a 
short period of time using either a sealed-bid or a dynamic auction format. The experiments suggest 
that the taxpayer cost of purchases using a well-designed and well-implemented auction program could 
be  small  using  either  auction  format,  to  the  extent  that  sellers  have  substantial  liquidity  needs. 
However, the dynamic auction format has significant advantages over the sealed-bid auction format for 
both the banks and the taxpayers, because the informational feedback provided during the auction 
enables the seller to manage better its liquidity needs. 
Our experiments focused on trading profits and liquidity needs as the bidder’s principal objectives. 
In practice, a seller of troubled assets also cares about its portfolio risk. For reasons of simplicity, we 
ignored portfolio risk in the experiments. However, there is good reason to expect that what we learned 
about a bidder’s challenges in managing liquidity would carry over to the issue of portfolio risk. It is the 
bidder’s ability to see, while the auction is still running, which asset sales are likely be successful that 
enables the bidder to better reach its revenue target in the dynamic auction. By the same token, the 
bidder’s ability to see which asset sales are likely be successful should enable the bidder to better 
manage its portfolio risk. Thus, explicitly including portfolio risk would likely strengthen the case for 
dynamic auctions over sealed-bid auctions for purchases of troubled assets. 
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Appendix A 
Analysis of Bidding Strategy in Experiment 2 
Each of the 19 expert bidders provided a summary of their bidding strategy during Experiment 2. 
Although  there  are  many  variations  of  strategies  employed,  the  following  summarize  the  primary 
strategy components from the bidders. 
Liquidity. All of the bidders described their strategy as heavily dependent on their liquidity draw. 
That is, they recognized that even though the securities were likely to close at a price below their 
respective common values, they could make money on the liquidity bonus. As a result, they selected 
certain securities on which to bid aggressively. Once determined, bidders would instantly supply-reduce 
to a level that just allowed them to meet their liquidity bonus if the price were to fall to their estimated 
dropout ratio. The immediate reduction was an effort to signal to other bidders that they should be 
reducing supply also. They will hold that level of the security until the price goes below their estimated 
dropout ratio, at which point they’d rapidly drop out of the auction. Once the liquidity bonus is satisfied 
they will drop out of the auction completely.  
Reference Prices. Bidders were generally aware that securities with low references prices were least 
likely to sell and thus they reduced their supply on those first. DI stated “I was more aggressive on the 
securities with a higher than average … reference price.” Many bidders compared their own signals to 
these reference prices as an indication of which securities to supply reduce first. Once determined, 
these ratios were often ranked from lowest (best) to highest (worst) to determine the appropriate 
aggressiveness to be used for each security. The lower the ratio on a security, the more aggressively the 
holder bid (i.e., the longer they held on to the security). If the ratio was above the reference price, they 
dropped out early.  
High Quality / Low Quality. Five bidders stated that they were going to focus their attention on the 
high quality securities as that would be the easiest way to achieve their liquidity bonus. However, there 
were 3 bidders who stated that they spread their attention across both pools and one bidder who 
focused on the lower quality pool because he thought it “will have relatively higher or positive P-CV.” 
Learning. Four of the bidders stated that it took 1-2 days to optimize their strategy. The bidders 
were divided on whether observing the actions of the other bidders was helpful in optimizing their own 
behavior. Some stated that the actions of the other bidders were not a helpful signal in determining 
their values, either because the other bidders were making mistakes or misrepresenting. AP states that 
he couldn’t get information from other bidders because “it was too easy to intentionally send out “bad” 
information…make  mistakes  …  and/or  play  irrationally.”  Others  felt  the  opposite.  BW  said  and  DI 
concurred that they’d watch what other bidders were selling and sell the same “because that specific 
security may have a lower common value.” Still other bidders stated that while specific information was 
hard to determine from the actions of other bidders, they were able to learn the general behavior of the 
other bidders as the auctions progressed (i.e., that bidders were more aggressive than they thought 
initially).  KD  stated,  “I  learned  that  broadly  speaking,  there  were  two  types  of  players:  those  who 
appreciated the benefits of supply reduction and those who did not.” KD continued that she would learn 
in  the  first  few  rounds  the  type  of  opponents  she  was  up  against  and  would  adjust  her  strategy 
accordingly. PS stated, “I believed other bidders will *supply reduce+. I was wrong…So in the remaining 
session, I just hung in the securities …without supply reducing.”  33 
 
Estimated  Dropout  Ratio.  To  achieve  their  respective  liquidity  goals,  bidders  would  hold  the 
necessary  quantity  of  securities  up  to  their  calculated  dropout  ratio.  These  dropout  ratios  were 
estimated in two steps. First, they would calculate a target CV-ref price ratio and then they would adjust 
it to determine the ratio at which they would drop out. Four of the bidders calculated the target ratio 
assuming the expected values for the unknown signals (75 and 25 for high and low, respectively). Seven 
bidders used only the ratio of their private signals to the reference price. Three bidders used the clearing 
ratio from previous similar experiments. Once these ratios were determined, seven of the bidders stated 
that they’d drop out completely when the price got to 50% of the target ratio. Other bidders used 
different  heuristics  or  downward  adjustments  as  to  when  they’d  drop  out.  For  example,  AV  kept 
significant quantities of securities “until we got around 96-94% of the initial price.” Several bidder stated 
that their level of confidence in their final dropout ratio was determined by the number of private 
signals they had: 4 private signals made them more confident with respect to the ratio; 1 signal made 
them less confident. Lower confidence with respect to the ratio caused them to behave as if the ratio 
were slightly above their calculated value. 
Supply  Reduction.  Regardless  of  the  reason,  most  bidders  reduced  their  supply  as  quickly  as 
possible, especially for those securities where their estimated true ratio was high, assuming these would 
not clear. Even in cases when they thought they could win, bidders often stated that they’d immediately 
supply reduce 50% and then hold on that quantity for a while. Many of the bidders stated that they 
were often hoping for tacit collusion, even when it did not come. For example, AV complains that “the 
other players would not reduce quantities significantly from a round to another.” JR states, “What was 
more frustrating was the fact that people just wouldn’t drop *their supply+.” JB says, “I didn’t see any 
way to elicit cooperation to get others to drop out sooner.” KM says, “my aim was always to induce 
people to drop quantities early on by dropping myself…usually I assumed that players would take equal 
responsibility for reductions.” Some bidders stated that they had a preference to supply reduce less for 
their larger holdings, because they knew more about those holdings. 
Sealed Bid vs. Clock Auctions. Many of the bidders stated that it was more difficult to play the 
sealed bid because they weren’t learning anything about the values of other bidders. As a result, they 
had to guess an optimal dropout ratio. BW and DI guessed an 80% ratio to drop out. Several players 
stated that they played more conservatively in the Sealed Bid auction. 
And there were other things that were conspicuously absent from their strategies: 
Differentiation between Less/More Precise. Almost no one stated a strategy difference between the 
two auction types. In fact, two of the bidders explicitly stated that they did nothing different between 
the more precise and less precise scenarios. Anyone using the bidding tool calculated the estimated true 
ratio with different assumptions for each of these scenarios (i.e., 12 vs. 8 total bidders for the more and 
less scenarios, respectively), but many bidders stated that they did not use the bidding tool. 
Activity Points. Only one bidder discussed a strategy that involved shifting supply to high signal / 
low reference price securities within the same pool in an effort to distract other bidders. Other than this, 
no one talked about using the activity point constraint as a means of passing information. 34 
 
Appendix B 
A Common-Value Auction with Liquidity Needs: 
Bidder Instructions for Experiment 1 
12 October 2008 
In this experiment, you are a bidder in a series of auctions conducted over four sessions. Each 
session is held on a different day and consists of four different auctions. Bidders are randomly assigned 
to each auction. Thus, you do not know who the other bidders are in any of your auctions. You will be 
bidding from your private cubical, which includes a computer and a bidder tool that is unique to you. We 
ask that you refrain from talking during the experiment. If you need assistance at any time, just raise 
your hand and one of the experimental staff will assist you. 
You  will  be  paid  at  the  end  of  the  experiment.  Your  payment  is  proportional  to  your  total 
experimental payoff—the sum of your payoffs from each of your auctions. In particular, you will receive 
$1 in take-home pay for every 10 million experimental dollars that you earn. Throughout, dollar figures 
refer to your experimental payoff unless explicitly stated otherwise—and the “millions” are generally 
suppressed. When explicitly stated, your real dollar payment will be referred to as your take-home 
payment.  We  anticipate  that  each  of  you  will  earn  a  take-home  payment  of  about  $100  per 
experimental session on average. However, your actual take-home payment will depend on your bidding 
strategy,  the  bidding  strategies  of  the  other  bidders  you  face,  and  the  particular  realizations  of 
numerous random events. 
In each auction, you will compete with other bidders to sell your holdings of eight securities to the 
Treasury. The eight different securities have different values. However, for each security, the bidders 
have a common value, which is unknown. Each bidder has an estimate of the common value. You profit 
by selling securities to the Treasury at prices above the securities’ true values. You also have a need for 
liquidity (cash). The sale of securities to the Treasury is your source of liquidity. Thus, you care about 
both profits and liquidity (your sales to the Treasury). 
Two formats are used: 
  Simultaneous uniform-price sealed-bid auction (“sealed-bid auction”). Bidders simultaneously 
submit supply curves for each of the eight securities. Supply curves are non-decreasing (i.e. 
upward-sloping) step functions. The auctioneer then forms the aggregate supply curve and 
crosses  it  with  the  Treasury’s  demand.  The  clearing  price  is  the  lowest-rejected  offer.  All 
quantity offered below the clearing price is sold at the clearing price. Quantity offered at the 
clearing price is rationed to balance supply and demand, using the proportionate rationing rule. 
  Simultaneous  descending  clock  auction  (“clock  auction”).  The  securities  are  auctioned 
simultaneously. There is a price “clock” for each security indicating its tentative price per unit of 
quantity. Bidders express the quantities they wish to supply at the current prices. The price is 
decremented for each security that has excess supply, and bidders again express the quantities 
they wish to supply  at the new prices. This  process repeats  until  supply is  made equal to 
demand. The tentative prices and assignments then become final. Details of the design are 
presented in Ausubel and Cramton (2008), which you received earlier. 
In each session, you will participate in four different auctions in the following order: 
1.  4-bidder sealed-bid. A sealed bid auction with four bidders. 35 
 
2.  8-bidder sealed-bid. A sealed bid auction with eight bidders. 
3.  4-bidder clock. A clock auction with four bidders. 
4.  8-bidder clock. A clock auction with eight bidders. 
Each session, one of your two 4-bidder auctions and one of your two 8-bidder auctions will be selected 
at  random.  Your  take-home  payment  from  the  session  will  be  based  on  the  number  of  (million) 
laboratory dollars that you earn in these two auctions only. 
1  Securities 
In each auction, eight securities are purchased by the Treasury. The bidders are symmetric, before 
the draws of bidder-specific private information about security values and liquidity needs.  
In each session, two sets of bidder-specific private information are drawn independently from the 
same probability distributions. The first set is used in the 4-bidder auctions (auctions 1 and 3); the 
second set is used in the 8-bidder auctions (auctions 2 and 4). You are given no feedback following the 
sealed-bid auctions; thus, your behavior in the clock auctions cannot be influenced by outcomes in the 
sealed-bid auctions of a session. 
In each 4-bidder auction, the Treasury demand is 1000 shares of each security, where each share 
corresponds to $1 million of face value. Each bidder has holdings of 1000 shares of each security. Thus, 
it is possible for a single bidder to fully satisfy the Treasury demand for a particular security; that is, for 
each security there may be just a single winner or there may be multiple winners. One quarter of the 
total available shares will be purchased by the Treasury. 
In each 8-bidder auction, the Treasury demand is 2000 shares of each security, where each share 
corresponds to $1 million of face value. Each bidder has holdings of 500 shares. Thus, at least four 
bidders are required to fully satisfy the Treasury demand—there must be at least four winners. One half 
of the total available shares will be purchased by the Treasury. 
2  Your preferences 
From each auction, your payoff depends on your profits and how well your liquidity needs are met. 
Common Value Auction  
The  value  of  each  security  in  cents  on  the  dollar  is  the  average  of  eight  iid  random  variables 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 100: 
 
Suppose you are bidder i.  
Your private information about security s is the realization uis. Notice that both for the 8-bidder and 
4-bidder auctions, the common value is the average of eight uniform draws, so that only the first four 
draws are revealed in the 4-bidder auction. This means that the true values have the same distribution 
in both 4-bidder and 8-bidder auctions and your private information has the same precision. 
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Liquidity need 
You have a liquidity need, Li, which is drawn iid from the uniform distribution on the interval [250, 
750]. You know your own liquidity need, but not that of the other bidders. You get a bonus of $1 for 
every dollar of sales to the Treasury up to your liquidity need of Li. You do not get any bonus for sales to 
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Thus, an additional dollar of cash is worth two dollars when your liquidity need is not satisfied, but 
is worth one dollar when your liquidity need is satisfied. 
3  Bidder tool and auction system 
You have an Excel workbook that contains your private information for each auction. You will use 
the tool to submit bids in the sealed-bid auctions. In addition, the tool has features that will help your 
decision making in each of the auctions. Each auction has its own sheet in the tool. It is essential that 
you are working from the correct sheet for each auction. For example the 4-bidder sealed-bid auction is 
the sheet named Sealed Bid 4.  
For the clock auctions, bidding is done via a commercial auction system customized to this setting. 
You use the web browser to connect to the auction system. For each clock auction, you must go to a 
new auction site. The URL for the auction site is given in the bidder tool on the particular auction sheet, 
Clock 4 or Clock 8, for the 4-bidder or 8-bidder clock auction. Once at the correct auction site, log in with 
the user name and password given on your auction sheet. 
The auction system is easy to use. You will have an opportunity to use it in the training seminar. 
An  important  feature  of  the  tool  is  the  calculation  of  expected  security  values  conditional  on 
information you specify. In a common value auction, it is important for you to condition your estimate of 
value on your signal and the information winning conveys. Since your bid is only relevant in the event 
that you win, you should set your bid to maximize your payoff in that event. In this way, you avoid the 
winner’s curse, which in this case is the tendency of a naïve bidder to lose money by selling shares at 
prices below what they are worth. In addition, in the clock auctions, the bidder also must condition on 
any  information  revealed  through  the  bidding  process.  The  tool  provides  one  flexible  method  of 
calculating an appropriate conditional expected value for each security. 37 
 
4  Bidding strategy 
The auction environment has three complicating features: 
  Common value auction. You have an imperfect estimate of the good’s common value. 
  Divisible good auction. Your bid is a supply curve, specifying the quantity you wish to sell at 
various prices. 
  Liquidity need. You have a specific liquidity need that is met through selling shares from your 
portfolio of eight securities. 
The combination of these factors makes a complete equilibrium analysis impossible. Nonetheless, 
equilibrium analysis is possible in a simplified environment. To aid your thinking about strategy, we 
discuss a particular strategy, which abstracts from the complications of a divisible good auction and the 
liquidity needs. In particular, we assume: 
1.  Each  bidder  submits  a  flat  supply  schedule;  that  is,  the  bidder  offers  to  sell  all  of  her 
holdings of a particular security at a specified price. 
2.  Each bidder ignores her liquidity need, bidding as if Li = 0. 
With  these  assumptions  it  is  possible  to  calculate  an  equilibrium  strategy,  which  we  call  the 
benchmark strategy. The analysis of this strategy will be helpful in thinking about the common value 
feature of the auction environment. 
We wish to emphasize that the benchmark strategy focuses on only one element of the auction. 
Your challenge is to determine your own strategy to maximize your payoff that reflects all aspects of 
the auction environment.  
4.1  Common value distribution 
As mentioned earlier, the value of each security in cents on the dollar is the average of eight iid 





, where  [0,100]. s is is iid
i
v u u U

   
The pdf and cdf of the common value are shown in Figure 1. The common value has a mean of 50 
and a standard deviation of 10.2. Notice that the common value is approximately normally distributed, 
since it is the sum of many independent draws. 38 
 
Figure 1. Probability density and cumulative distribution of common value 
 
You are bidder i. Your private information about security s is the realization uis. 
4.2  Sealed-bid uniform-price reverse auction 
Under our strong simplifying assumptions, the auction is equivalent to a unit-supply common value 
auction with uniform pricing. In this case, just as in a single-item second-price auction, your bid does not 
determine what you pay, only the likelihood of winning, thus  the best strategy is to bid your true 
conditional expected value for the good. The trick, however, is to condition on your signal and the 
information that winning conveys. 
In the 4-bidder auction, under the benchmark assumptions, there is only a single winner, so the 
correct condition is as derived in Milgrom and Weber (1982). Your bid is your expected value conditional 
on your signal being the lowest and on the second-lowest signal being equal to yours: 
  1 2 1 | , , is s is b E v u u u u     
where u1 is the lowest signal and u2 is the second-lowest signal. The reason you condition on the second-
lowest signal being as low as yours is that the bid must be optimal when it is on the margin and thus 
impacts whether you win. Your bid becomes marginal and hence decisive only in the event that you tie 
with the second-lowest.  
For the 8-bidder auction, there are exactly four winners. Hence, we need to generalize the above 
formula to multiple winners. The optimal rule is to bid the expected value conditional on your signal 
being the fourth-lowest signal and on the fifth-lowest signal being equal to yours: 
  4 5 4 | , , is s is b E v u u u u     
where u4 is the fourth-lowest signal and u5 is the fifth-lowest signal.  
Since the signals are uniformly distributed, it is easy to calculate the above conditional values. In 
both case, the conditional value is a linear function of your signal. 
In the 4-bidder auction, there is a single winner. The conditioning is that you win, the next lowest 
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In the 8-bidder auction, there are four winners. The conditioning is that you have the fourth-lowest 
signal, the fifth-lowest signal is the same, the three signals below you are evenly distributed below your 
signal and zero, and the remaining three bidders are evenly distributed above your signal: 
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4.3  Descending clock auction 
In the clock auction, under the benchmark assumption, you will observe the price at which other 
bidders drop out. This provides additional information on which to condition your bid. Here we assume 
that the price clock is continuous. In the actual experiment, the price clock is discrete, and although 
bidders can make reductions at any price, you will only learn the aggregate supply at the end of round 
price. You may want to assume the quantity reduction occurred half-way between the prior price and 
the ending price. 
When the clock starts, you calculate your dropout point in the same way as above. As the price 
clock falls, one of the other bidders may drop out. When the first bidder drops out, you can calculate 










where the slope and intercept are taken the formulas above. With this new information on which to 
condition your bid, the revised optimal bid for the 8-bidder clock auction is straightforward to calculate. 
8-bidder clock strategy 
No one has dropped out: 
100 1
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Similarly, we can calculate the analogous formulas for the 4-bidder clock auction. 
4-bidder clock strategy 
No one has dropped out:   
100 1
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Two bidders have dropped out:    43
1
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Note  that  the  above  formulas  are  all  linear  in  the  dropout  price,  so  it  is  easy  to  invert  to  get 
compute the bidder’s signal. 
4.4  Moving beyond the benchmark strategy 
The bidding tool is set up to calculate the conditional expected values assuming the benchmark 
strategy. Of course, you (and others) may well deviate from the benchmark strategy as a result of 
liquidity needs or other reasons, since these other factors are ignored in the benchmark calculation. 
The bidding tool allows for this variation in a number of ways. First, in the sealed-bid auctions your 
bid can be any upward sloping step function to account for liquidity and possible supply reduction by 
you or others. Second, in the clock auctions, the tool lets you interpret what a dropout is and where it 
occurs.  This  is  useful  and  necessary  when  bidders  make  partial  reductions  of  supply.  In  addition, 
although the tool will calculate a particular signal based on a dropout, you are free to type in any signal 
inference  you  like.  Whatever  you  type  as  “my  best  guess”  will  be  used  in  the  calculation  of  the 
conditional expected value. 
Further details of the tool will be explained in the training seminar. 
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and an assistant will help 
you. 
Remember your overall goal is to maximize your experimental payoff in each auction. You should 
think carefully about what strategy is best apt to achieve this goal. 
Many thanks for your participation. 41 
 
Appendix C 
A Common-Value Reference-Price Auction with Liquidity Needs: 
Bidder Instructions for Experiment 2 
20 October 2008 
In this experiment, you are a bidder in a series of auctions conducted over four sessions. Each 
session is held on a different day and consists of four different auctions. Bidders are randomly assigned 
to each auction. Thus, you do not know who the other bidders are in any of your auctions. You will be 
bidding from your private cubical, which includes a computer and a bidder tool that is unique to you. We 
ask that you refrain from talking during the experiment. If you need assistance at any time, just raise 
your hand and one of the experimental staff will assist you. 
You  will  be  paid  at  the  end  of  the  experiment.  Your  payment  is  proportional  to  your  total 
experimental payoff—the sum of your payoffs from each of your auctions. In particular, you will receive 
$1  in  take-home  pay  for  every  one  hundred  thousand  experimental  dollars  (100  $k)  that  you  earn. 
Throughout, dollar figures refer to your experimental payoff unless explicitly stated otherwise—and the 
“thousands” are generally suppressed. When explicitly stated, your real dollar payment will be referred 
to as your take-home payment. We anticipate that each of you will earn a take-home payment of about 
$100 per experimental session on average. However, your actual take-home payment will depend on 
your  bidding  strategy,  the  bidding  strategies  of  the  other  bidders  you  face,  and  the  particular 
realizations of numerous random events. 
In each auction, you will compete with other bidders to sell your holdings of eight securities to the 
Treasury. The eight securities are split into two pools: four securities are low quality and four are high 
quality. The eight different securities have different values. However, for each security, the bidders have 
a common value, which is unknown. Each bidder has an estimate of the common value. You profit by 
selling securities to the Treasury at prices above the securities’ true values. You also have a need for 
liquidity (cash). The sale of securities to the Treasury is your source of liquidity. Thus, you care about 
both profits and liquidity (your sales to the Treasury). The Treasury has allocated a particular budget for 
the purchase of each pool of securities within each auction. Its demand for high-quality securities is 
distinct from its demand for low-quality securities.  
Before each auction, the auctioneer assigns each security a reference price (expressed in cents on 
the dollar of face value), which represents the Treasury’s best estimate of what each security is worth. 
For example, a high-quality security might be assessed to be worth 75 cents on the dollar, while a low-
quality  security  might  be  assessed  to  be  worth  25  cents  on  the  dollar.  A reference-price  auction 
determines the price-point—a percentage of the reference price—for each pool of securities. A winning 
bidder is paid the pool’s price-point  the security’s reference price for each unit of the security sold. 
Two formats are used: 
  Simultaneous uniform-price sealed-bid auction (“sealed-bid auction”). Bidders simultaneously 
submit supply curves for each of the eight securities. Supply curves are non-decreasing (i.e. 
upward-sloping) step functions, offering a quantity at each price-point. The auctioneer then 
forms  the aggregate supply curve and crosses it with the Treasury’s demand. This is  done 
separately for each pool (i.e., for high- and low-quality securities, separately). The clearing 
price-point is the lowest-rejected offer. All quantity offered at below the clearing price-point is 
sold at the clearing price-point times the security’s reference price. Quantity offered at exactly 42 
 
the clearing price-point is rationed to balance supply and demand, using the proportionate 
rationing rule. 
  Simultaneous  descending  clock  auction  (“clock  auction”).  The  securities  are  auctioned 
simultaneously. There are two descending clocks, one for high-quality securities and one for 
low-quality securities, indicating the tentative price-point of each pool. Bidders express the 
quantities they wish to supply at the current price-points. The price-point is decremented for 
each pool of securities that has excess supply, and bidders again express the quantities they 
wish to supply at the new price-points. This process repeats until supply is made equal to 
demand. The tentative price-points and assignments then become final. Details of the design 
are presented in Ausubel and Cramton (2008), which you received earlier. 
The  proportionate  rationing  rule  only  plays  a  role  in  the  event  that  multiple  bidders  make 
reductions at the clearing price. The rule then accepts the reductions at the clearing price in proportion 
to the size of each bidder’s reduction at the clearing price. Thus, if a reduction of 300 is needed to clear 
the market and two bidders made reductions of 400 and 200 at the clearing price, then the reductions 
are rationed proportionately: the first is reduced by 200 and the second is reduced by 100. The actual 
reduction of the first bidder is twice as large as the second bidder, since the first bidder’s reduction as 
bid is twice as large as the second bidder’s reduction. Ties can generally be avoided by refraining from 
bidding price-points that are round numbers, instead specifying price-points to odd one-hundredths of a 
percent (e.g., 98.42). 
The clock auction has an activity rule to encourage price discovery. In particular, for each security 
pool, the quantities bid must be an upward-sloping supply curves as expressed in activity points. More 
precisely, activity points—equal to the reference price  quantity, summed over the four securities in 
the pool—are computed for each bid. The number of activity points is not permitted to increase as the 
price-point descends. Thus, you are allowed to switch quantities across the four securities in a pool, but 
your total activity points for the pool cannot increase as the auction progresses. 
The same activity rule applies to the sealed-bid auction, but then in a single round of bidding. 
In each session, you will participate in four different auctions:  
1.  Sealed-bid auction, with more precise reference prices 
2.  Clock auction, with more precise reference prices 
3.  Sealed-bid auction, with less precise reference prices 
4.  Clock auction, with less precise reference prices 
On  Tuesday  and  Thursday,  the  order  of  auctions  will  be  as  above.  On  Wednesday  and  Friday,  the 
auctions with less precise reference prices will be done first.  
In each session, one of your two auctions with more precise reference prices and one of your two 
auctions with less precise reference prices will be selected at random. Your take-home payment from 
the session will be based on the number of experimental dollars that you earn in these two auctions 
only. 
1  Securities 
In each auction, the Treasury has a demand for each pool of securities: high quality and low quality. 
The bidders have bidder-specific private information about security values and liquidity needs.  43 
 
In each session, two sets of bidder-specific private information are drawn independently from the 
same probability distributions. The first set is used in the auctions with more precise reference prices 
(auctions 1 and 2); the second set is used in the auctions with less precise reference prices (auctions 3 
and  4).  You  are  given  no  feedback  following  each  sealed-bid  auction;  thus,  your  behavior  in  the 
subsequent clock auction cannot be influenced by the outcome in the prior sealed-bid auction. 
The bidders differ in their security holdings as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Holdings of securities by bidder and security in thousand $ of face value 
 
Thus, there are four holders of each security: one large (50%), one medium (25%), and two small 
(12.5% each). Each bidder holds 20,000 ($k of face value) of high-quality securities and 20,000 ($k of 
face value) of low-quality securities. 
The  four  high-quality  securities  are  pooled  together  and  sold  as  a  pool;  the  four  low-quality 
securities are pooled together and sold as a second pool. Whether done as a sealed-bid auction or done 
as a clock auction, the two pools are auctioned simultaneously. The Treasury has a budget of $30,000k 
for high-quality securities and a budget of $10,000k for low-quality securities. Thus, given the expected 
prices of 75 cents on the dollar for high-quality and 25 cents on the dollar for low-quality (see below), 
the Treasury can be expected to buy a quantity of about 40,000 ($k of face value), or 25% of face value, 
of each security pool. Between pools, there is no explicit interaction. However, the bidder’s liquidity 
needs are based on sales from both pools together. 
You are one of the eight bidders. You will have the same bidder number in auctions with more 
precise reference prices (auctions 1 and 2); you will have the same bidder number in auctions with less 
precise reference prices (auctions 3 and 4). Therefore, your holdings of securities and your signals will be 
the same in auctions 1 and 2 , and they will also be the same in auctions 3 and 4. However, you will have 
different holdings of securities and signals in auctions 3 and 4, as compared with auctions 1 and 2. 
2  Your preferences 
From each auction, your payoff depends on your profits and how well your liquidity needs are met. 
Common Value Auction  
The value of each high-quality security s  {H1,H2,H3,H4} in cents on the dollar is the average of n 
iid random variables uniformly distributed between 50 and 100: 
H1 H2 H3 H4 L1 L2 L3 L4 Total
1 20,000 5,000 5,000 10,000 40,000
2 20,000 10,000 5,000 5,000 40,000
3 20,000 5,000 10,000 5,000 40,000
4 20,000 5,000 5,000 10,000 40,000
5 5,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 40,000
6 10,000 5,000 5,000 20,000 40,000
7 5,000 10,000 5,000 20,000 40,000
8 5,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 40,000
Total 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Expected price 75 75 75 75 25 25 25 25
Expected value 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Total value 120,000 40,000
Bidder
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The value of each low-quality security s  {L1,L2,L3,L4} in cents on the dollar is the average of n iid 
random variables uniformly distributed between 0 and 50: 
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For auctions with more precise reference prices, n = 16; for auctions with less precise reference 
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Thus,  the  reference  price  is  based  on  eight  realizations  in  the  more  precise  case  (1/2  of  all 
realizations) and on four realizations in the less precise case (1/3 of all realizations). Reference prices are 
made public before each auction starts. 
For each 5,000 of security holdings, bidder i receives as private information one of the realizations 
ujs. Thus, bidder 1, who holds 20,000 of security 1, gets four realizations. In this way, those with larger 
holdings  have  more  precise  information  about  the  security’s  value.  Observe  that  this  specification 
requires the holders of each given security to receive collectively a total of eight realizations. Since there 
are eight realizations available (besides the ones that form the reference price), each of the realizations 
ujs (i = 1, …, 8) can be observed by exactly one bidder. 
Suppose that the auction clearing price-point is pH for the high-quality pool and pL for the low-
quality pool, where the price-point in the auction is stated as a fraction of the reference price. Then ps = 
pH rs for s  {H1,H2,H3,H4} and ps = pL rs for s  {L1,L2,L3,L4}. 
If a bidder sells the quantity qs (in thousand $ of face value) of the security s at the price ps, then 
profit (in thousand $) is 
1
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The 1/100 factor in the formula above and other formulas involving price is to convert cents into dollars. 
Liquidity  
Each bidder has a liquidity need, Li in thousands, which is drawn iid from the uniform distribution 
on  the  interval  [2500,  7500].  Each  bidder  knows  his  own  liquidity  need,  but  not  that  of  the  other 
bidders. The bidder receives a bonus of $1 for every dollar of sales to the Treasury up to his liquidity 
need: 
1
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Thus, an additional dollar of cash is worth two dollars when the bidder’s liquidity need is not 
satisfied, but is worth one dollar when the liquidity need is satisfied. 
3  Bidder tool and auction system 
You have an Excel workbook that contains your private information for each auction. The tool has 
features that will help your decision making in each of the auctions. Each auction has its own sheet in 
the tool. It is essential that you are working from the correct sheet for each auction. For example the 
sealed bid auction with more precise reference prices is the sheet named Sealed Bid More.  
Bidding  is  done  via  a  commercial  auction  system  customized  to  this  setting.  You  use  the  web 
browser to connect to the auction system. For each auction, you must go to a new auction site. The URL 
for the auction site is given in the bidder tool on the particular auction sheet. Once at the correct 
auction site, log in with the user name and password given on your auction sheet. 
The auction system is easy to use. You will have an opportunity to use it in the training seminar. 
An  important  feature  of  the  tool  is  the  calculation  of  expected  security  values  conditional  on 
information you specify. In a common value auction, it is important for you to condition your estimate of 
value on your signal and the information winning conveys. Since your bid is only relevant in the event 
that you win, you should set your bid to maximize your payoff in that event. In this way, you avoid the 
winner’s curse, which in this case is the tendency of a naïve bidder to lose money by selling shares at 
prices below what they are worth. In addition, in the clock auctions, the bidder also must condition on 
any information revealed through the bidding process.  
The bidding tool provides one flexible method of calculating an appropriate conditional expected 
value for each security. In particular, the tool is set up to calculate the conditional expected values for 
each security, given the information that you know—the reference price and your own signals—and 
your best guesses for the relevant other signals. Making appropriate guesses for the other signals is an 
important element of your strategy. Once these guesses are made, the tool will calculate the common 
value of the security based on your entries. In the clock auction, you can adjust your estimates of other 
signals as you learn from the quantity drops of the other bidders. 
The tool also lets you keep track of your liquidity bonus based on estimates that you enter for 
expected prices and expected quantities sold of each security. 
Further details of the tool will be explained in the training seminar. 
4  Bidding strategy 
The auction environment has five complicating features: 
  Common value auction. You have an imperfect estimate of each security’s common value. 
  Divisible good auction. Your bid is a supply curve, specifying the quantity you wish to sell at 
various price-points. 46 
 
  Demand for pool of securities. The Treasury does not have a demand for individual securities, 
but for pools of securities (high- and low-quality pools). 
  Asymmetric holdings. Bidders have different holdings of securities. 
  Liquidity need. You have a specific liquidity need that is met through selling shares from your 
portfolio of eight securities. 
The combination of these factors makes a complete equilibrium analysis difficult or impossible, 
even when we make strong simplifying assumptions. For this reason we will refrain from providing any 
sort of benchmark strategy. 
Your challenge is to determine your own strategy to maximize your payoff that reflects all aspects of 
the auction environment. The best response in this auction, as in any auction is a best response to what 
the other bidders are actually doing. 
It will be helpful to have an appreciation for the probability density of the common value in various 
circumstances.  
Figure 1 displays the pdf of the common value for low-quality securities in the more precise case by 
the size of the bidder’s holdings, assuming that all the known signals take on the mean value of 25. Thus, 
when the bidder holds 20,000 of the security there are 4 unknown signals and the standard deviation is 
1.8; when the bidder holds 10,000 there are 6 unknown signals and the standard deviation is 2.2; when 
the bidder holds 5,000 there are 7 unknown signals and the standard deviation is 2.5. 
Figure 1. Probability density of common value in more precise case by size of holdings 
 
Figure 2 displays the pdf of the common value for low-quality securities in the less precise case by 
the size of the bidder’s holdings, assuming that all the known signals take on the mean value of 25. Thus, 
when the bidder holds 20,000 of the security there are 4 unknown signals and the standard deviation is 
2.4; when the bidder holds 10,000 there are 6 unknown signals and the standard deviation is 2.9; when 
the bidder holds 5,000 there are 7 unknown signals and the standard deviation is 3.2. 
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Figure 2. Probability density of common value in less precise case by size of holdings 
 
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and an assistant will help 
you. 
Remember your overall goal is to maximize your experimental payoff in each auction. You should 
think carefully about what strategy is best apt to achieve this goal. 
Many thanks for your participation.  
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Appendix D 
A Common-Value Auction: 
Bidder Instructions for Experiment 3.1 
5 November 2008 
In this experiment, you are a bidder in a series of auctions conducted over two sessions (Thursday, 
6 November and Saturday, 8 November). Each session is held on a different day and consists of four 
different auctions. Bidders are randomly assigned to each auction. Thus, you do not know who the other 
bidders are in any of your auctions. You will be bidding from your private cubical, which includes a 
computer and a bidder tool that is unique to you. We ask that you refrain from talking during the 
experiment. If you need assistance at any time, just raise your hand and one of the experimental staff 
will assist you. 
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. In each session, your earnings will be based on your 
payoff from two randomly selected auctions (out of four total auctions). Your take-home payment is 
then proportional to your total experimental earnings from sessions 1 and 2. In particular, you will 
receive $0.40 in take-home pay for every one-million experimental dollars that you earn. Throughout the 
remainder of the document, dollar figures refer to your experimental payoff unless explicitly stated 
otherwise—and  the  “millions”  are  generally  suppressed.  When  explicitly  stated,  your  real  dollar 
payment will be referred to as your take-home payment. We anticipate that each of you will earn a take-
home payment of about $100 per experimental session on average. However, your actual take-home 
payment will depend on your bidding strategy, the bidding strategies of the other bidders you face, and 
the particular realizations of numerous random events. 
In each auction, you will compete with other bidders to sell your holdings of eight securities to the 
Treasury. The eight different securities have different values. However, for each security, the bidders 
have a common value, which is unknown. Each bidder has an estimate of the common value. You profit 
by  selling  securities  to  the  Treasury  at  prices  above  the  securities’  true  values.  Unlike  in  previous 
experiments, you do not value liquidity. Thus your payoffs are based solely on profits from your sale of 
securities to the Treasury. 
Two formats are used: 
  Simultaneous uniform-price sealed-bid auction (“sealed-bid auction”). Bidders simultaneously 
submit supply curves for each of the eight securities. Supply curves are non-decreasing (i.e. 
upward-sloping) step functions. The auctioneer then forms the aggregate supply curve and 
crosses  it  with  the  Treasury’s  demand.  The  clearing  price  is  the  lowest-rejected  offer.  All 
quantity offered below the clearing price is sold at the clearing price. Quantity offered at the 
clearing price is rationed to balance supply and demand, using the proportionate rationing rule. 
  Simultaneous  descending  clock  auction  (“clock  auction”).  The  securities  are  auctioned 
simultaneously. There is a price “clock” for each security indicating its tentative price per unit of 
quantity. Bidders express the quantities they wish to supply at the current prices. The price is 
decremented for each security that has excess supply, and bidders again express the quantities 
they wish to supply  at the new prices. This  process repeats  until  supply is  made equal to 
demand. The tentative prices and assignments then become final. Details of the design are 
presented in Ausubel and Cramton (2008), which you received earlier. 49 
 
The  proportionate  rationing  rule  only  plays  a  role  in  the  event  that  multiple  bidders  make 
reductions at the clearing price. The rule then accepts the reductions at the clearing price in proportion 
to the size of each bidder’s reduction at the clearing price. Thus, if a reduction of 300 is needed to clear 
the market and two bidders made reductions of 400 and 200 at the clearing price, then the reductions 
are rationed proportionately: the first is reduced by 200 and the second is reduced by 100. The actual 
reduction of the first bidder is twice as large as the second bidder, since the first bidder’s reduction as 
bid is twice as large as the second bidder’s reduction. Ties can generally be avoided by refraining from 
bidding price-points that are round numbers, instead specifying price-points to odd one-hundredths of a 
percent (e.g., 98.42). 
The clock auction has an activity rule to encourage price discovery. In particular, for each security, 
the quantities bid must be an upward-sloping supply curve. The quantity of a security is not permitted to 
increase as the price descends. 
In each session, you will participate in two pairs of auctions in the following order: 
1.  4-bidder sealed-bid, first pair. A sealed bid auction with four bidders. 
2.  4-bidder clock, first pair. A clock auction with four bidders. The values of securities and your 
signals will be identical to those in the sealed-bid above. 
3.  4-bidder sealed-bid, second pair. A sealed bid auction with four bidders. 
4.  4-bidder clock, second pair. A clock auction with four bidders. The values of securities and 
your signals will be identical to those in the sealed-bid above. 
Each session, one of your first pair of auctions and one of your second pair of auctions will be 
selected at random. Your take-home payment from the session will be based on the number of (million) 
laboratory dollars that you earn in these two auctions only. 
1  Securities 
In each auction, eight securities are purchased by the Treasury. The bidders are symmetric, before 
the draws of bidder-specific private information about security values.  
In each session, two sets of bidder-specific private information are drawn independently from the 
same probability distributions. The first set is used in the first pair of auctions (auctions 1 and 2); the 
second set is used in the second pair of auctions (auctions 3 and 4). You are given no feedback following 
the sealed-bid auctions; thus, your behavior in the clock auctions cannot be influenced by outcomes in 
the sealed-bid auctions of a session. 
In  each  auction,  the  Treasury  demand  is  1000  shares  of  each  security,  where  each  share 
corresponds to $1 million of face value. Each bidder has holdings of 1000 shares of each security. Thus, 
it is possible for a single bidder to fully satisfy the Treasury demand for a particular security; that is, for 
each security there may be just a single winner or there may be multiple winners. One quarter of the 
total available shares will be purchased by the Treasury. 
2  Your preferences 
From each auction, your payoff depends on your profits from the sale of securities to the Treasury. 
Common Value Auction  50 
 
The  value  of  each  security  in  cents  on  the  dollar  is  the  average  of  eight  iid  random  variables 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 100: 
 
Suppose you are bidder i.  
Your private information about security s is the realization uis. Notice that the common value is the 
average of eight uniform draws, so that only the first four draws are revealed (as there are only four 
bidders in the auction).  
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3  Bidder tool and auction system 
You have an Excel workbook that contains your private information for each auction. The tool has 
features that will help your decision making in each of the auctions. Each auction has its own sheet in 
the tool. It is essential that you are working from the correct sheet for each auction. For example the 
sealed-bid, first-pair auction is the sheet named Sealed Bid First Pair.  
For each of  the auctions, bidding is  done via  a  commercial auction  system customized  to  this 
setting. You use the web browser to connect to the auction system. For each auction, you must go to a 
new auction site. The URL for the auction site is given in the bidder tool on the particular auction sheet, 
Sealed Bid First Pair, Clock First Pair, Sealed Bid Second Pair, or Clock Second Pair. Once at the correct 
auction site, log in with the user name and password given on your auction sheet. 
The auction system is easy to use. It is identical to the system you used for bidding in all previous 
experiments. 
An  important  feature  of  the  tool  is  the  calculation  of  expected  security  values  conditional  on 
information you specify. In a common value auction, it is important for you to condition your estimate of 
value on your signal and the information winning conveys. Since your bid is only relevant in the event 
that you win, you should set your bid to maximize your payoff in that event. In this way, you avoid the 
winner’s curse, which in this case is the tendency of a naïve bidder to lose money by selling shares at 
prices below what they are worth. In addition, in the clock auctions, the bidder also must condition on 
any  information  revealed  through  the  bidding  process.  The  tool  provides  one  flexible  method  of 
calculating an appropriate conditional expected value for each security. 
4  Bidding strategy 
The auction environment has two complicating features: 
  Common value auction. You have an imperfect estimate of the good’s common value. 
  Divisible good auction. Your bid is a supply curve, specifying the quantity you wish to sell at 
various prices. 
The combination of these factors makes a complete equilibrium analysis difficult. Nonetheless, 
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discuss a particular strategy, which abstracts from the complications of a divisible good auction. In 
particular, we assume that each bidder submits a flat supply schedule; that is, the bidder offers to sell all 
of her holdings of a particular security at a specified price. 
With  these  assumptions  it  is  possible  to  calculate  an  equilibrium  strategy,  which  we  call  the 
benchmark strategy. The analysis of this strategy will be helpful in thinking about the common value 
feature of the auction environment. 
We wish to emphasize that the benchmark strategy focuses on only one element of the auction. 
Your challenge is to determine your own strategy to maximize your payoff that reflects all aspects of 
the auction environment.  
4.1  Common value distribution 
As mentioned earlier, the value of each security in cents on the dollar is the average of eight iid 
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The pdf and cdf of the common value are shown in Figure 1. The common value has a mean of 50 
and a standard deviation of 10.2. Notice that the common value is approximately normally distributed, 
since it is the sum of many independent draws. 
Figure 1. Probability density and cumulative distribution of common value 
 
You are bidder i. Your private information about security s is the realization uis. 
4.2  Sealed-bid uniform-price reverse auction 
Under our strong simplifying assumptions, the auction is equivalent to a unit-supply common value 
auction with uniform pricing. In this case, just as in a single-item second-price auction, your bid does not 
determine what you pay, only the likelihood of winning, thus  the best strategy is to bid your true 
conditional expected value for the good. The trick, however, is to condition on your signal and the 



























In the 4-bidder auction, under the benchmark assumptions, there is only a single winner, so the 
correct condition is as derived in Milgrom and Weber (1982). Your bid is your expected value conditional 
on your signal being the lowest and on the second-lowest signal being equal to yours: 
  1 2 1 | , , is s is b E v u u u u     
where u1 is the lowest signal and u2 is the second-lowest signal. The reason you condition on the second-
lowest signal being as low as yours is that the bid must be optimal when it is on the margin and thus 
impacts whether you win. Your bid becomes marginal and hence decisive only in the event that you tie 
with the second-lowest.  
Since the signals are uniformly distributed, it is easy to calculate the above conditional values. In 
both case, the conditional value is a linear function of your signal. 
In the 4-bidder auction, there is a single winner. The conditioning is that you win, the next lowest 
bidder has your value, and the remaining two bidders are evenly distributed above your value: 
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4.3  Descending clock auction 
In the clock auction, under the benchmark assumption, you will observe the price at which other 
bidders drop out. This provides additional information on which to condition your bid. Here we assume 
that the price clock is continuous. In the actual experiment, the price clock is discrete, and although 
bidders can make reductions at any price, you will only learn the aggregate supply at the end of round 
price. You may want to assume the quantity reduction occurred half-way between the prior price and 
the ending price. 
When the clock starts, you calculate your dropout point in the same way as above. As the price 
clock falls, one of the other bidders may drop out. When the first bidder drops out, you can calculate 










where the slope and intercept are taken the formulas above. With this new information on which to 
condition your bid, the revised optimal bid for the 4-bidder clock auction is straightforward to calculate. 
4-bidder clock strategy 
No one has dropped out:   
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Two bidders have dropped out:    43
1
2 4 50 .
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Note  that  the  above  formulas  are  all  linear  in the  dropout  price,  so  it  is  easy  to  invert  to  get 
compute the bidder’s signal. 
100 1






        
 53 
 
4.4  Moving beyond the benchmark strategy 
The bidding tool is set up to calculate the conditional expected values assuming the benchmark 
strategy. Of course, you (and others) may well deviate from the benchmark strategy. 
The bidding tool allows for this variation in a number of ways. First, in the sealed-bid auctions your 
bid can be any upward sloping step function to account for possible supply reduction by you or others. 
Second, in the clock auctions, the tool lets you interpret what a dropout is and where it occurs. This is 
useful and necessary when bidders make partial reductions of supply. In addition, although the tool will 
calculate a particular signal based on a dropout, you are free to type in any signal inference you like. 
Whatever you type as “my best guess” will be used in the calculation of the conditional expected value. 
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and an assistant will help 
you. 
Remember your overall goal is to maximize your experimental payoff in each auction. You should 
think carefully about what strategy is best apt to achieve this goal. 
Many thanks for your participation. 54 
 
Appendix E 
A Common-Value Reference-Price Auction: 
Bidder Instructions for Experiment 3.2 
8 November 2008 
In this experiment, you are a bidder in a series of auctions conducted over two sessions (Monday, 
10 November and Tuesday, 11 November). Each session is held on a different day and consists of four 
different auctions. Bidders are randomly assigned to each auction. Thus, you do not know who the other 
bidders are in any of your auctions. You will be bidding from your private cubical, which includes a 
computer and a bidder tool that is unique to you. We ask that you refrain from talking during the 
experiment. If you need assistance at any time, just raise your hand and one of the experimental staff 
will assist you. 
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. In each session, your earnings will be based on your 
payoff from two randomly selected auctions (out of four total auctions). Your take-home payment is 
then proportional to your total experimental earnings from sessions 1 and 2. In particular, you will 
receive  $0.30  in  take-home  pay  for  every  one  thousand  experimental  dollars  ($k)  that  you  earn. 
Throughout, dollar figures refer to your experimental payoff unless explicitly stated otherwise—and the 
“thousands” are generally suppressed. When explicitly stated, your real dollar payment will be referred 
to as your take-home payment. We anticipate that each of you will earn a take-home payment of about 
$100 per experimental session on average. However, your actual take-home payment will depend on 
your  bidding  strategy,  the  bidding  strategies  of  the  other  bidders  you  face,  and  the  particular 
realizations of numerous random events. 
In each auction, you will compete with other bidders to sell your holdings of eight securities to the 
Treasury. The eight securities are split into two pools: four securities are low quality and four are high 
quality. The eight different securities have different values. However, for each security, the bidders have 
a common value, which is unknown. Each bidder has an estimate of the common value. You profit by 
selling securities to the Treasury at prices above the securities’ true values. The Treasury has allocated a 
particular budget for the purchase of each pool of securities within each auction. Its demand for high-
quality securities is distinct from its demand for low-quality securities.  
Before each auction, the auctioneer assigns each security a reference price (expressed in cents on 
the dollar of face value), which represents the Treasury’s best estimate of what each security is worth. 
For example, a high-quality security might be assessed to be worth 75 cents on the dollar, while a low-
quality  security  might  be  assessed  to  be  worth  25  cents  on  the  dollar.  A reference-price  auction 
determines the price-point—a percentage of the reference price—for each pool of securities. A winning 
bidder is paid the pool’s price-point  the security’s reference price for each unit of the security sold. 
Two formats are used: 
  Simultaneous uniform-price sealed-bid auction (“sealed-bid auction”). Bidders simultaneously 
submit supply curves for each of the eight securities. Supply curves are non-decreasing (i.e. 
upward-sloping) step functions, offering a quantity at each price-point. The auctioneer then 
forms  the aggregate supply curve and crosses  it with the Treasury’s demand. This is  done 
separately for each pool (i.e., for high- and low-quality securities, separately). The clearing 
price-point is the lowest-rejected offer. All quantity offered at below the clearing price-point is 
sold at the clearing price-point times the security’s reference price. Quantity offered at exactly 55 
 
the clearing price-point is rationed to balance supply and demand, using the proportionate 
rationing rule. 
  Simultaneous  descending  clock  auction  (“clock  auction”).  The  securities  are  auctioned 
simultaneously. There are two descending clocks, one for high-quality securities and one for 
low-quality securities, indicating the tentative price-point of each pool. Bidders express the 
quantities they wish to supply at the current price-points. The price-point is decremented for 
each pool of securities that has excess supply, and bidders again express the quantities they 
wish to supply at the new price-points. This process repeats until supply is made equal to 
demand. The tentative price-points and assignments then become final. Details of the design 
are presented in Ausubel and Cramton (2008), which you received earlier. 
The  proportionate  rationing  rule  only  plays  a  role  in  the  event  that  multiple  bidders  make 
reductions at the clearing price. The rule then accepts the reductions at the clearing price in proportion 
to the size of each bidder’s reduction at the clearing price. Thus, if a reduction of 300 is needed to clear 
the market and two bidders made reductions of 400 and 200 at the clearing price, then the reductions 
are rationed proportionately: the first is reduced by 200 and the second is reduced by 100. The actual 
reduction of the first bidder is twice as large as the second bidder, since the first bidder’s reduction as 
bid is twice as large as the second bidder’s reduction. Ties can generally be avoided by refraining from 
bidding price-points that are round numbers, instead specifying price-points to odd one-hundredths of a 
percent (e.g., 98.42). 
The clock auction has an activity rule to encourage price discovery. In particular, for each security 
pool, the quantities bid must be an upward-sloping supply curves as expressed in activity points. More 
precisely, activity points—equal to the reference price  quantity, summed over the four securities in 
the pool—are computed for each bid. The number of activity points is not permitted to increase as the 
price-point descends. Thus, you are allowed to switch quantities across the four securities in a pool, but 
your total activity points for the pool cannot increase as the auction progresses. 
The same activity rule applies to the sealed-bid auction, but then in a single round of bidding. 
In each session, you will participate in two pairs of auctions in the following order: 
5.  Sealed-bid auction, first pair. 
6.  Clock auction, first pair. 
7.  Sealed-bid auction, second pair. 
8.  Clock auction, second pair. 
In all cases, the reference prices will be based on 4 signals. That is, the reference prices will be 
analogous to those used in the less precise auctions from experiment 2. 
Each session, one of your first pair of auctions and one of your second pair of auctions will be 
selected at random. Your take-home payment from the session will be based on the number of (million) 
laboratory dollars that you earn in these two auctions only. 
1  Securities 
In each auction, the Treasury has a demand for each pool of securities: high quality and low quality. 
The bidders have bidder-specific private information about security values.  56 
 
In each session, two sets of bidder-specific private information are drawn independently from the 
same probability distributions. The first set is used in the first pair of auctions (auctions 1 and 2); the 
second set is used in the second pair of auctions (auctions 3 and 4). You are given no feedback following 
each sealed-bid auction; thus, your behavior in the subsequent clock auction cannot be influenced by 
the outcome in the prior sealed-bid auction. 
The bidders differ in their security holdings as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Holdings of securities by bidder and security in thousand $ of face value 
 
Thus, there are four holders of each security: one large (50%), one medium (25%), and two small 
(12.5% each). Each bidder holds 20,000 ($k of face value) of high-quality securities and 20,000 ($k of 
face value) of low-quality securities. 
The  four  high-quality  securities  are  pooled  together  and  sold  as  a  pool;  the  four  low-quality 
securities are pooled together and sold as a second pool. Whether done as a sealed-bid auction or done 
as a clock auction, the two pools are auctioned simultaneously. The Treasury has a budget of $30,000k 
for high-quality securities and a budget of $10,000k for low-quality securities. Thus, given the expected 
prices of 75 cents on the dollar for high-quality and 25 cents on the dollar for low-quality (see below), 
the Treasury can be expected to buy a quantity of about 40,000 ($k of face value), or 25% of face value, 
of each security pool. Between pools, there is no explicit interaction. 
You are one of the eight bidders. You will have the same bidder number in the first pair of auctions 
(auctions 1 and 2); you will have the same bidder number in the second pair of auctions (auctions 3 and 
4). Therefore, your holdings of securities and your signals will be the same in auctions 1 and 2 , and they 
will also be the same in auctions 3 and 4. However, you will have different holdings of securities and 
signals in auctions 3 and 4, as compared with auctions 1 and 2. 
2  Your preferences 
From each auction, your payoff depends on your profits. 
Common Value Auction  
The value of each high-quality security s  {H1,H2,H3,H4} in cents on the dollar is the average of 12 
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H1 H2 H3 H4 L1 L2 L3 L4 Total
1 20,000 5,000 5,000 10,000 40,000
2 20,000 10,000 5,000 5,000 40,000
3 20,000 5,000 10,000 5,000 40,000
4 20,000 5,000 5,000 10,000 40,000
5 5,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 40,000
6 10,000 5,000 5,000 20,000 40,000
7 5,000 10,000 5,000 20,000 40,000
8 5,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 40,000
Total 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Expected price 75 75 75 75 25 25 25 25
Expected value 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Total value 120,000 40,000
Bidder
High-Quality Securities Low-Quality Securities57 
 
The value of each low-quality security s  {L1,L2,L3,L4} in cents on the dollar is the average of 12 iid 
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Thus, the reference price is based on four realizations (1/3 of all realizations). Reference prices are 
made public before each auction starts. 
For each 5,000 of security holdings, bidder i receives as private information one of the realizations 
ujs. Thus, bidder 1, who holds 20,000 of security 1, gets four realizations. In this way, those with larger 
holdings  have  more  precise  information  about  the  security’s  value.  Observe  that  this  specification 
requires the holders of each given security to receive collectively a total of eight realizations. Since there 
are eight realizations available (besides the ones that form the reference price), each of the realizations 
ujs (i = 1, …, 8) can be observed by exactly one bidder. 
Suppose that the auction clearing price-point is pH for the high-quality pool and pL for the low-
quality pool, where the price-point in the auction is stated as a fraction of the reference price. Then ps = 
pH rs for s  {H1,H2,H3,H4} and ps = pL rs for s  {L1,L2,L3,L4}. 
If a bidder sells the quantity qs (in thousand $ of face value) of the security s at the price ps, then 
profit (in thousand $) is 
1
100 ( , , ) ( ) . i i s s is
s
p q v p v q     
The 1/100 factor in the formula above and other formulas involving price is to convert cents into dollars. 
3  Bidder tool and auction system 
You have an Excel workbook that contains your private information for each auction. The tool has 
features that will help your decision making in each of the auctions. Each auction has its own sheet in 
the tool. It is essential that you are working from the correct sheet for each auction. For example the 
sealed bid auction from the first pair is the sheet named Sealed Bid First Pair.  
Bidding  is  done  via  a  commercial  auction  system  customized  to  this  setting.  You  use  the  web 
browser to connect to the auction system. For each auction, you must go to a new auction site. The URL 
for the auction site is given in the bidder tool on the particular auction sheet. Once at the correct 
auction site, log in with the user name and password given on your auction sheet. 
The auction system is easy to use. It is identical to the system you used for bidding in all previous 
experiments. 
An  important  feature  of  the  tool  is  the  calculation  of  expected  security  values  conditional  on 
information you specify. In a common value auction, it is important for you to condition your estimate of 
value on your signal and the information winning conveys. Since your bid is only relevant in the event 
that you win, you should set your bid to maximize your payoff in that event. In this way, you avoid the 
winner’s curse, which in this case is the tendency of a naïve bidder to lose money by selling shares at 58 
 
prices below what they are worth. In addition, in the clock auctions, the bidder also must condition on 
any information revealed through the bidding process.  
The bidding tool provides one flexible method of calculating an appropriate conditional expected 
value for each security. In particular, the tool is set up to calculate the conditional expected values for 
each security, given the information that you know—the reference price and your own signals—and 
your best guesses for the relevant other signals. Making appropriate guesses for the other signals is an 
important element of your strategy. Once these guesses are made, the tool will calculate the common 
value of the security based on your entries. In the clock auction, you can adjust your estimates of other 
signals as you learn from the quantity drops of the other bidders. 
4  Bidding strategy 
The auction environment has four complicating features: 
  Common value auction. You have an imperfect estimate of each security’s common value. 
  Divisible good auction. Your bid is a supply curve, specifying the quantity you wish to sell at 
various price-points. 
  Demand for pool of securities. The Treasury does not have a demand for individual securities, 
but for pools of securities (high- and low-quality pools). 
  Asymmetric holdings. Bidders have different holdings of securities. 
The combination of these factors makes a complete equilibrium analysis difficult or impossible, 
even when we make strong simplifying assumptions. For this reason we will refrain from providing any 
sort of benchmark strategy. 
Your challenge is to determine your own strategy to maximize your payoff that reflects all aspects of 
the auction environment. The best response in this auction, as in any auction is a best response to what 
the other bidders are actually doing. 
It will be helpful to have an appreciation for the probability density of the common value in various 
circumstances.  
Figure 1 displays the pdf of the common value for low-quality securities by the size of the bidder’s 
holdings, assuming that all the known signals take on the mean value of 25. Thus, when the bidder holds 
20,000 of the security there are 4 unknown signals and the standard deviation is 2.4; when the bidder 
holds 10,000 there are 6 unknown signals and the standard deviation is 2.9; when the bidder holds 
5,000 there are 7 unknown signals and the standard deviation is 3.2. 59 
 
Figure 1. Probability density of common value by size of holdings 
 
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and an assistant will help 
you. 
Remember your overall goal is to maximize your experimental payoff in each auction. You should 
think carefully about what strategy is best apt to achieve this goal. 
Many thanks for your participation. 
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